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ABSTRACT—Digital technologies have taken individualized advertising to 
an unprecedented level. But the convenience and efficiency of such highly 
tailored content comes at a high price: unbridled access to our personal data. 
The rise of sophisticated data-driven practices, otherwise known as “Big 
Data,” enables large datasets to be analyzed in ways that reveal useful 
patterns about human behavior. Thanks to these novel analytical techniques, 
businesses can cater to individual consumer needs better than ever before. 
Yet the opportunities presented by Big Data pose new ethical challenges. 
Significant scholarly research has examined algorithmic discrimination 
and consumer manipulation, as well as the ways that data-driven practices 
undermine our democratic system by dramatically altering the news 
ecosystem. Current scholarship has especially focused on the ways 
illegitimate foreign and domestic operatives exploit the advertising tools of 
digital platforms to spread fake and divisive messages to those most 
susceptible to influence. However, more scholarly attention should be 
devoted to how these digital technologies are exploited by legitimate 
political actors, such as politicians and campaigns, to win elections. 
By combining data-driven voter research with personalized advertising, 
political actors engage in political microtargeting, directing communications 
at niche audiences. Political microtargeting fits within a broader 
conversation about data-privacy regulation, as individuals lack sufficient 
control over how digital companies handle their personal data. The First 
Amendment currently limits data-privacy reform, so any meaningful 
changes must reconcile data privacy with the First Amendment. 
Professor Jack Balkin has argued that online service providers should 
be defined as “information fiduciaries,” or businesses that, because of their 
relationship with another, have taken on special duties with respect to the 
information they obtain in the course of the relationship. Because online 
service providers receive sensitive information from their end users, 
Professor Balkin argues they should be subject to additional regulation. 
Treating online service providers as information fiduciaries provides a viable 
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means to reconcile the First Amendment with data-privacy regulation: the 
First Amendment has not prevented the state or federal government from 
regulating how certain professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, interact 
with their clients and use their personal information because these 
professionals share a fiduciary relationship with their clients. Therefore, 
consistent with the First Amendment, the government should also be able to 
subject online service providers to reasonable restrictions on their handling 
of end-user data.  
This Note expands Professor Balkin’s information-fiduciary framework 
by arguing that federal legislation should place fiduciary duties on online 
service providers. In doing so, it responds to scholarly critiques of Professor 
Balkin’s theory, particularly the criticism that he failed to show how 
information fiduciaries might function in practice. Using political 
microtargeting on Facebook as an example, this Note spells out the ways that 
fiduciary duties might be enforced. This Note argues that holding Facebook 
and other digital platforms that engage in political advertising to an 
information-fiduciary standard would ameliorate some of the adverse effects 
of political microtargeting and promote electoral integrity in the digital age. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In today’s digital landscape, personalization is the name of the game.1 
From the food we eat, to the shows we watch, to the music we stream, to 
even the people we date, digital technologies have taken individualized 
advertising to an unprecedented level,2 drastically transforming the choices 
we make in our everyday lives.3 Craving a cheeseburger and fries from the 
comfort of your home? Here’s a list of the ten closest hamburger joints 
available for delivery, courtesy of Uber Eats.4 Finished with Friends and in 
desperate search of a new comedy series to binge-watch? Netflix has got you 
covered with a list of related shows that fit your viewing needs.5 Dreading 
that long commute to work? Spotify’s “Made For You” service combines all 
your favorite tunes in one place,6 making your daily commute a little bit more 
bearable. Ready to settle down and find that special someone? Match.com 
has got your perfect match.7 While modern digital technologies bring endless 
possibilities for optimizing the user experience, the convenience and 
efficiency of such highly tailored content comes at a crucial price: unbridled 
access to our personal data.8 
 
 1 See, e.g., Nik Spirin, An Overview of Personalization Technologies Across the Internet, MEDIUM 
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://medium.com/technology-insights/an-overview-of-personalization-technologies-
across-the-internet-c641299abfab [https://perma.cc/74U6-PYHN] (“Personalization [is] at the core of 
many modern internet services . . . .”); Shayna Hodkin, The Internet of Me: Creating a Personalized Web 
Experience, WIRED (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/the-internet-of-me 
[https://perma.cc/6RBE-HYBV] (“The Internet you experience is as unique to you as your fingerprint.”). 
 2  See Amanda Zantal-Wiener, These 9 Brands Take Personalized Marketing to a New Level, 
HUBSPOT (June 1, 2020), https://blog.hubspot.com/marketing/marketing-personalization-examples 
[https://perma.cc/LK48-L3JV] (illustrating how specific brands have offered a “personalized and 
meaningful marketing experience” in a way that is not overly intrusive). 
 3  ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU 9 (2011) 
(describing digital platforms as creating “a unique universe of information” that “fundamentally alters 
the way we encounter ideas and information”). 
 4  See generally How Uber Eats Works, UBER EATS, https://about.ubereats.com 
[https://perma.cc/3822-RXAM] (informing customers generally about what they can browse and how 
they can order through Uber Eats). 
 5  See How Netflix’s Recommendations System Works, NETFLIX, https://help.netflix. 
com/en/node/100639 [https://perma.cc/EY8P-UZFA]. 
 6  See Made for You, SPOTIFY, https://support.spotify.com/us/article/made-for-you-playlists 
[https://perma.cc/7EVS-8B74]. 
 7  See About Match.com, MATCH, https://www.match.com/help/aboutus.aspx?lid=4 
[https://perma.cc/EHZ6-ZF3H]. 
 8  See SAM MACBETH, CLIQZ, TRACKING THE TRACKERS: ANALYSING THE GLOBAL TRACKING 
LANDSCAPE WITH GHOSTRANK 13 (2017), https://cdn.cliqz.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Ghostery 
_Study_-_Tracking_the_Trackers.pdf [https://perma.cc/624Z-HUAQ] (finding that Google and 
Facebook track “64% and 29% of pages loaded on the web,” respectively); see also James Pasley, 28 
Ways Companies and Governments Can Collect Your Personal Data and Invade Your Privacy Every 
Day, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 21, 2020, 9:42 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/invasion-of-data-
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Our personal data is the oil fueling today’s digital economy.9 The term 
“personal data” refers to personally identifiable information that can be 
linked to a specific individual.10 Whether making purchases at a store, eating 
at a restaurant, shopping for a car, or surfing the web, consumers engage in 
activities on a daily basis that reveal valuable personal information about 
them.11 There are three main ways that companies can collect personal data: 
ask their customers directly for it,12 indirectly track them,13 or acquire the 
data from other entities.14 The rise of sophisticated, data-driven practices, 
otherwise known as “Big Data,”15 enables large datasets to be analyzed in 
 
privacy-online-in-person-examples-2020-1 [https://perma.cc/3M7L-SSZP] (“In modern life, privacy is 
relinquished in so many ways—from your daily commute, to how productive you are at work, to what 
you search on Google, to what you buy in a store.”).  
 9 Louise Matsakis, The WIRED Guide to Your Personal Data (and Who Is Using It), WIRED (Feb. 
15, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-personal-data-collection 
[https://perma.cc/6CCS-LWRC] (“Personal data is often compared to oil—it powers today’s most 
profitable corporations, just like fossil fuels energized those of the past.”). 
 10  What Is Personal Data?, INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-
data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/key-definitions/what-is-personal-
data [https://perma.cc/Y6H4-Y6BS]. Personal data may include anything from “[s]ocial media posts, 
location data, and search-engine queries” to more sensitive information such as “[h]ealth records, social 
security numbers, and banking details.” Matsakis, supra note 9. 
 11 See Sharing Information: A Day in Your Life, FTC, http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/media/video-
0022-sharing-information-day-your-life [https://perma.cc/LU6V-JD94]. 
 12 When a customer subscribes to a service or buys something online for the first time, a company 
will likely ask for a name and email address. Customer surveys are another way to directly ask for data 
from consumers. William Goddard, How Do Big Companies Collect Customer Data?, IT CHRONS. (Jan. 
14, 2019), https://itchronicles.com/big-data/how-do-big-companies-collect-customer-data [https:// 
perma.cc/9QD3-ZF6Q]. 
 13 Companies can also obtain customer data through online trackers. Websites may be equipped with 
cookies that inform companies about what customers have looked at online and where they go after 
they’ve finished browsing the company’s site. This cross-site tracking function explains why when you 
look at a pair of sneakers on a website, you will frequently find an ad for the same sneakers following 
you around the web. See id. Furthermore, apps such as Uber, Snapchat, Spotify, and Tinder are embedded 
with third-party “trackers” that provide customer data used “for targeted advertising, behavioral analytics, 
and location tracking.” See ISP Privacy Lab Publishes Research on Hidden Trackers, YALE L. SCH. (Nov. 
28, 2017), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/isp-privacy-lab-publishes-research-hidden-trackers 
[https://perma.cc/U5LT-ELUA]. 
 14 Third-party companies known as data brokers exist for the sole purpose of collecting, analyzing, 
and selling data to companies for targeted advertising campaigns. Data brokers collect data from 
commercial, government, and other publicly available sources. See FTC, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/
data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527data 
brokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/SSA5-WFGY]. 
 15 Jenifer Winter, Algorithmic Discrimination: Big Data Analytics and the Future of the Internet, in 
THE FUTURE INTERNET: ALTERNATIVE VISIONS 125, 128 (Jenifer Winter & Ryota Ono eds., 2015) 
(defining “Big Data” as “the term used to describe large, complex data sets that require novel data 
management tools”). 
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ways that reveal useful patterns about human behavior.16 “Big Data is crucial 
to the . . . development of algorithms and artificial intelligence” (AI), which 
companies rely upon to classify and make decisions about consumers. 17 
Thanks to these new analytical techniques, businesses are able to cater to 
individual consumer needs better than ever before.18 
But the opportunities presented by Big Data also pose new ethical 
challenges. Businesses might offer different products, services, or prices to 
consumers based on their data profiles, giving rise to “algorithmic 
discrimination”—the presence of bias within computer systems that creates 
unfair or discriminatory outcomes.19 Algorithmic discrimination has already 
sparked lawsuits20 and led to proposed legislation requiring companies to 
evaluate their algorithms for impacts on accuracy, discrimination, privacy, 
and security.21 
Furthermore, Big Data offers a unique window into consumer 
psychology, as sophisticated prediction algorithms not only analyze 
individual behaviors, but also make inferences about intimate psychological 
traits, such as personality, IQ, and political orientation. 22  While 
 
 16  What Is Big Data?, ORACLE, https://www.oracle.com/big-data/what-is-big-data.html 
[https://perma.cc/W8JT-NWD6] (“Put simply, big data is larger, more complex data sets . . . . [that] can 
be used to address business problems you wouldn’t have been able to tackle before.”). 
 17 Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New 
School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1154, 1156 (2018). 
 18 See, e.g., Frank van den Driest, Stan Sthanunathan & Keith Weed, Building an Insights Engine, 
94 HARV. BUS. REV. 64, 66 (2016) (describing how a customer-centric approach serves as a powerful 
source of competitive advantage in the Big Data era). 
 19  Winter, supra note 15, at 131 (“[Big Data] exposes sensitive behaviors or other personal 
information that could be used to disadvantage certain individuals or groups by corporations or 
governments. For example, citizens may experience political and economic discrimination related to 
housing, immigration, employment, political, or health-related behaviors.” (citation omitted)). 
 20 See, e.g., Reed Albergotti, Group of Black Creators Sue YouTube, Alleging Racial Discrimination, 
INDEPENDENT (June 18, 2020, 7:26 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/science-and-
technology/youtube-black-creators-suing-legal-action-google-nicoles-view-a9573176.html [https:// 
perma.cc/6ESE-UE98] (describing a lawsuit filed against YouTube alleging racial discrimination relating 
to the platform’s systematic removal of content); Ariana Tobin, HUD Sues Facebook over Housing 
Discrimination and Says the Company’s Algorithms Have Made the Problem Worse, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 
28, 2019, 1:18 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/hud-sues-facebook-housing-discrimination-
advertising-algorithms [https://perma.cc/LHH2-ZWM5] (discussing a lawsuit filed against Facebook 
alleging housing discrimation related to the company’s algorithms). 
 21 See Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (requiring companies to 
study and fix flawed computer algorithms that result in inaccurate, biased, or discriminatory decisions 
affecting Americans). 
 22 Sandra C. Matz & Oded Netzer, Using Big Data as a Window into Consumers’ Psychology, 
18 CURRENT OP. BEHAV. SCI. 7, 8 (2017). 
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psychological targeting can help consumers make better choices,23 it can also 
be used to exploit individual vulnerabilities, generating concerns over 
consumer manipulation. 24  Significant research has centered on the 
potentially discriminatory effects of algorithm-based decisions 25  and the 
implications of Big Data on consumer manipulation.26 Recent scholarship 
has also examined how these data-driven practices undermine our 
democratic system by dramatically altering the news ecosystem27 and the 
electoral process.28 
 
 23  Psychologically personalized marketing can alleviate the problem of choice overload, help 
maximize the happiness consumers gain from their choices, and prove effective in changing behaviors 
among patients and groups who are at risk. See, e.g., Barry Schwartz & Andrew Ward, Doing Better but 
Feeling Worse: The Paradox of Choice, in POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY IN PRACTICE 86, 97–99 (P. Alex 
Linley & Stephen Joseph eds., 2004) (discussing the consequences associated with an overabundance of 
choice, which includes an uptick in clinical depression); Sandra C. Matz, Joe J. Gladstone & David 
Stillwell, Money Buys Happiness when Spending Fits Our Personality, 27 PSYCHOL. SCI. 715, 722 (2016) 
(finding “that individuals’ happiness can be increased through the consumption of products that match 
[an individual’s] psychological chararacteristics”). 
 24 See, e.g., Brett Abarbanel, Sally M. Gainsbury, Daniel King, Nerilee Hing & Paul H. Delfabbro, 
Gambling Games on Social Platforms: How Do Advertisements for Social Casino Games Target Young 
Adults?, 9 POL’Y & INTERNET 184, 202–04 (2016) (explaining how advertisements for social gambling 
games on platforms encourage gambling among youth but are not subject to the same regulations as real-
money gambling). 
 25 See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 
671, 677–93 (2016) (explaining that data-driven analyses often reinforce discrimination against members 
of protected groups); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
857, 880–81 (2017) (showing that algorithms based on inaccurate or unrepresentative data can lead to 
discrimination against minority applicants). 
 26 See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 996, 999 (2014) 
(exploring companies’ ability to collect data on consumers and the costs associated with how this unduly 
influences consumer decision-making); Max N. Helveston, Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 859, 897–98 (2016) (“[W]hen insurers have the ability to influence the behavior of 
their customers, they will push policyholders to act in ways that do not maximize overall societal utility.”). 
 27 See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Changing Ecosystem of News and Challenges for Freedom of the 
Press, 64 LOY. L. REV. 499, 500–02 (2018) (“The ecosystem of news has changed beyond the 
imagination of anyone living when the First Amendment was drafted.”). 
 28 See, e.g., Matthew Crain & Anthony Nadler, Political Manipulation and Internet Advertising 
Infrastructure, 9 J. INFO. POL’Y 370, 370 (2019) (explaining that “digital advertising infrastructure, as it 
is currently designed and managed, creates opportunities for political manipulation and foreign 
interference” in U.S. elections). 
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Digital platforms such as Facebook,29 Twitter,30 and Google,31 while 
designed to reach broad audiences, foster community, and propagate the 
spread of diverse voices and ideas, have instead created digital echo 
chambers32 that paradoxically inhibit the online marketplace of ideas.33 Much 
like in commercial advertising, personalization has become the norm in the 
news industry.34 Today, data-driven algorithms, rather than human editors, 
determine the news we receive.35 Yet, the underlying algorithms and digital 
advertising infrastructure that dictate content visibility remain hidden from 
public view, creating an imbalance of power and information between digital 
platforms and their end users of enormous political consequence.36 
 
 29  Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards 
[https://perma.cc/2J3U-D4SA] (“Building community and bringing the world closer together depends on 
people’s ability to share diverse views, experiences, ideas and information.”).  
 30  The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules 
[https://perma.cc/WZT9-4KKK] (“Our rules are to ensure all people can participate in the public 
conversation freely and safely.”). 
 31  Community Guidelines, GOOGLE, https://about.google/community-guidelines [https:// 
perma.cc/SQK4-GY4D] (“Community guidelines exist to support the healthy and open discussion that 
has always been a part of our culture.”). 
 32 Minow, supra note 27, at 500 (“A majority of people in the United States now receive news 
selected for them by a computer-based mathematical formula derived from their past interests, producing 
echo chambers with few opportunities to learn, understand, or believe what others are hearing as news.”). 
 33 The marketplace-of-ideas model of the First Amendment finds its roots in Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s “free trade in ideas” conception of free speech. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). According to this model, ideas must be allowed to compete freely in an 
unregulated market, whereby the best ideas will ultimately gain acceptance by competing with others in 
the marketplace. See id. Both Justice Holmes and Justice Louis Brandeis shared the belief that the proper 
remedy for harmful ideas in the marketplace is not censorship, but counterspeech. See Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[T]he remedy to be applied is more 
speech, not enforced silence.”). The counterspeech doctrine posits “that ‘bad speech’ can be effectively 
countered or cured with more speech.” Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: A New 
Look at the Old Remedy for “Bad” Speech, 2000 BYU L. REV. 553, 554. 
 34 See, e.g., Sarah Perez, Plex Adds Personalized, Streaming News to Its Media Player Software, 
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 26, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/26/plex-adds-personalized-
streaming-news-to-its-media-player-software [https://perma.cc/UU7P-9M8Q] (describing Plex’s new 
“personalized newscast that adapts to your interests based on what programming you watch and skip, 
among other things”); Casey Newton, Google Introduces the Feed, a Personalized Stream of News on 
iOS and Android, THE VERGE (July 19, 2017, 3:05 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/7/19/1599415
6/google-feed-personalized-news-stream-android-ios-app [https://perma.cc/R7TN-T8UJ] (discussing 
Google’s new personalized news feed consisting “of articles, videos, and other content”). 
 35 Frank A. Pasquale, The Automated Public Sphere, in THE POLITICS OF BIG DATA: BIG DATA, BIG 
BROTHER? 110, 112 (Ann Rudinow Sætan, Ingrid Schneider & Nicols Green eds., 2018) (“Megafirms 
like Facebook and Google have largely automated the types of decisions once made by managers and 
programmers at television networks, or editors at newspapers.”). 
 36 Zeynep Tufekci, Engineering the Public: Big Data, Surveillance and Computational Politics, 
19 FIRST MONDAY (2014), https://firstmonday.org/article/view/4901/4097 [https://perma.cc/2ZQL-
RN8M] (“[Digital] platforms operate via algorithms the specifics of which are mostly opaque to people 
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The threat of political manipulation by rogue actors who deploy bots 
and use fake social media accounts has dominated the headlines.37 Current 
scholarship has largely focused on the extent to which these illegitimate 
foreign and domestic operatives exploit the advertising tools of digital 
platforms to spread false and divisive messages;38 however, more scholarly 
attention should be devoted to the ways in which these same technologies 
are exploited by legitimate political actors, such as politicians and 
campaigns, to win elections. 
Recognizing the new possibilities offered by social media, political 
campaigns have increasingly turned to digital advertising to target voters.39 
By combining data-driven voter research with personalized advertising, 
political actors engage in political microtargeting, directing communications 
at niche audiences. 40  Online platforms provide a unique and powerful 
mechanism for influencing voters because they allow political ads to be 
targeted at certain audiences while remaining unseen by others, thus making 
it difficult for opposing candidates to counter targeted ads with their own 
messages. 41  During the 2016 election, the political-consulting company 
Cambridge Analytica reportedly exploited personal data from eighty-seven 
 
outside the small cadre of technical professionals within the company with regards to content visibility, 
data sharing and many other features of political consequence.”). 
 37 See, e.g., Adam Goldman, Justice Dept. Accuses Russians of Interfering in Midterm Elections, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/us/politics/russia-interference-
midterm-elections.html [https://perma.cc/6XW7-BEXW] (discussing federal charges against Russians 
alleged to have spread disinformation and attempted to interfere with the 2018 U.S. midterm elections). 
 38 See, e.g., Crain & Nadler, supra note 28, at 371 (assessing “policies for addressing the use of 
digital advertising systems by foreign operatives and other manipulative agents trying to influence 
elections, shape political discourse, inflame social division, and undermine democracy”); ELIZABETH 
BODINE-BARON, TODD C. HELMUS, ANDREW RADIN & ELINA TREYGER, COUNTERING RUSSIAN SOCIAL 
MEDIA INFLUENCE, at ix (2018) (analyzing “different approaches and policy options to respond to the 
specific threat of Russian influence on social media in the United States”). This Note uses the terms 
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” to distinguish between actors who are seeking office themselves versus 
political actors who seek to influence election results on behalf of other, hidden interest groups. 
 39 See, e.g., Jeff Chester & Kathryn C. Montgomery, The Role of Digital Marketing in Political 
Campaigns, 6 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2017) (“[D]ata-driven digital marketing has moved into the 
centre of American political operations . . . .”). 
 40 Jacquelyn Burkell & Priscilla M. Regan, Voting Public: Leveraging Personal Information to 
Construct Voter Preference, in BIG DATA, POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING AND THE LAW: DEMOCRACY AND 
PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF MICRO-TARGETING 47, 60 (Normann Witzleb, Moira Paterson & Janice 
Richardson eds., 2020) (microtargeting is “achieved through the development of information-rich 
‘enhanced voter files’ that integrate information from a wide range of sources[,] . . . . allow[ing] political 
communicators to reach particular voters with messages designed specifically to influence them”). 
 41 To increase advertising transparency, Facebook recently added an Ad Library feature that allows 
the public to access any active ads, including those hidden from users who were not part of an advertiser’s 
intended audience. See Ad Library, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ads/library 
[https://perma.cc/8S7N-V83L]. 
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million Facebook users to sway voters to support Donald Trump’s 
campaign. 42  Although Cambridge Analytica was shut down in 2018, 43 
politicians and campaigns are increasingly reliant on similar data-collection 
and data-processing practices to target voters.44 Most voters are unaware of 
how their personal data is continuously collected and weaponized by 
political actors. 45  The pervasive use of Big Data by political campaigns 
spotlights how digital platforms have enabled illegitimate and legitimate 
actors alike to manipulate voters, demonstrating the inextricable link 
between data-privacy protection and electoral integrity. 
In response to the Cambridge Analytica scandal, Senator Dianne 
Feinstein introduced the Voter Privacy Act of 2019 on July 31, 2019, which 
was designed to provide voters with greater control over how their personal 
data is used in federal elections.46 Two additional Democratic proposals, 
announced in May 2020, aimed at regulating how political campaigns can 
target ads.47 These proposals remain stalled in Congress. Some social media 
companies have made preemptive changes. Google now limits its targeting 
parameters to age, gender, and general location,48 and Twitter has banned 
 
 42 See Cecilia Kang & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Says Cambridge Analytica Harvested Data of up 
to 87 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/mark-
zuckerberg-testify-congress.html [https://perma.cc/FC9J-7M4Y]; Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas 
Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-
campaign.html [https://perma.cc/QL7D-HLVA]. 
43 See Colin Lecher, Cambridge Analytica Is Shutting Down, THE VERGE (May 2, 2018, 2:08 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/2/17311892/cambridge-analytica-us-offices-shutting-down-faceboo 
k-scandal [https://perma.cc/W89N-YY56]. 
 44 Gillian Tett, Can You Win an Election Without Digital Skulduggery?, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/b655914a-3209-11ea-9703-eea0cae3f0de [https://perma.cc/VX8D-Y87X] 
(describing how Michael Bloomberg built a secretive data group called Hawkfish, which hired former 
Facebook employees and allegedly spoke to former Cambridge Analytica employees). 
 45  See Why Is Advertising Transparency Important?, PRIV. INT’L (Aug. 5, 2019), 
https://privacyinternational.org/explainer/3288/why-advertising-transparency-important [https://perma. 
cc/RN3D-B6EA] (“At present, companies like Facebook, Google, and Twitter are not doing enough to 
provide their users with ads transparency. Importantly, in most countries around the world, users cannot 
understand why they’re being targeted with political ads at all.”). 
 46 See Voter Privacy Act, S. 2398, 116th Cong. (2019). The bill would give voters five basic rights 
regarding their personal information: (1) right of access, (2) right of notice, (3) right of deletion, (4) right 
to prohibit transfer, and (5) right to prohibit targeting. Id. 
 47  See Lauren Feiner, Democratic Bills Aim at Cracking Down on Targeted Political Ads on 
Facebook and Google, CNBC (May 26, 2020, 8:21 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/26/democratic-
bills-crack-down-on-political-ad-microtargeting-online.html [https://perma.cc/89G3-JRTJ]. 
 48 Rachel Sandler, Google Limits Microtargeting for Paid Political Ads, FORBES (Nov. 20, 2019, 
8:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelsandler/2019/11/20/google-limits-microtargeting-for-
paid-political-ads/#63f3c93f51ec [https://perma.cc/SB7Q-FVNF]. 
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political advertisements altogether. 49  Crucially missing from this list is 
Facebook, where as many as 43% of Americans consume their news,50 and 
where as much as $797 million in political ads was projected to be spent 
during the 2020 election alone. 51  Despite mounting pressure, Facebook 
continued to allow microtargeting ahead of the 2020 election, and refused to 
police the truthfulness of its political ads.52 
Outside of the political-advertising context, efforts to promote data 
privacy are unfolding at both the state and federal level.53 Legislatures in 
twenty-five states and Puerto Rico either considered or enacted data-privacy 
bills in 2019.54 An array of federal privacy bills have also been introduced in 
Congress.55 In May of 2018, Vermont became the first state to regulate data 
 
 49 Lauren Feiner, Twitter Bans Political Ads After Facebook Refused to Do So, CNBC (Oct. 30, 2019, 
5:50 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/30/twitter-bans-political-ads-after-facebook-refused-to-do-
so.html [https://perma.cc/T3WA-X3FG]. 
 50 John Gramlich, 10 Facts About Americans and Facebook, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/16/facts-about-americans-and-facebook [https://perma. 
cc/U7L7-VACW]. 
 51 Kate Gibson, Spending on U.S. Digital Political Ads to Top $1 Billion for First Time, CBS NEWS 
(Feb. 12, 2020, 6:10 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/spending-on-us-digital-political-ads-to-cross-
1-billion-for-first-time [https://perma.cc/LXH5-XSTB]. In the third quarter of 2020 alone, “political 
advertisers . . . spent at least $264 million on Facebook” ads. See Ari Levy, Salvador Rodriguez & Megan 
Graham, Why Political Campaigns Are Flooding Facebook with Ad Dollars, CNBC (Oct. 9, 2020, 12:32 
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/08/trump-biden-pacs-spend-big-on-facebook-as-election-nears. 
html [https://perma.cc/7MW4-B5MQ]. Facebook decided that it would stop featuring new political ads 
the week before the election as well as for a period of time following the election. See Mike Isaac, 
Facebook Widens Ban on Political Ads as Alarm Rises over Election, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/07/technology/facebook-political-ads-ban.html 
[https://perma.cc/VA7G-6497]. 
 52 Associated Press, Facebook Refuses to Restrict Untruthful Political Ads and Micro-Targeting, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2020, 9:13 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jan/09/facebook-
political-ads-micro-targeting-us-election [https://perma.cc/EH9P-GRGY]. Facebook started to label, but 
not fact-check, posts about the 2020 election by prompting users to visit USA.gov to receive official 
voting information. See Sonam Sheth, Facebook Added a Label to Trump’s Post Claiming That Voting 
by Mail Will Lead to a ‘CORRUPT ELECTION,’ BUS. INSIDER (July 21, 2020, 9:59 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-adds-label-trump-post-about-mail-in-voting-2020-7 
[https://perma.cc/434W-29MA]. 
 53 Hamsini Sridharan & Margaret Sessa-Hawkins, States Countering Digital Deception, MAPLIGHT 
(June 25, 2019), https://maplight.org/story/states-countering-digital-deception [https://perma.cc/AYP4-
D598]. 
 54 2019 Consumer Data Privacy Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 3, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/consumer-data-
privacy/calif.aspx [https://perma.cc/5S8K-Z82S]. 
 55 See, e.g., Privacy Bill of Rights Act, S. 1214, 116th Cong. (2019); Social Media Privacy Protection 
and Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong.; Online Privacy Act of 2019, H.R. 4978, 116th 
Cong.; American Data Dissemination Act of 2019, S. 142, 116th Cong.; Consumer Online Privacy Rights 
Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. (2019); Designing Accounting Safeguards to Help Broaden Oversight and 
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brokers.56 California followed, enacting the nation’s most comprehensive 
data-privacy law to date: the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).57 
The CCPA requires companies to disclose to users what data is being 
collected about them and how it is used, and gives users the right to delete 
that data and prevent its sale.58 Maine59 and Nevada60 came next, bringing the 
total to four enacted state laws. The Maine and Nevada bills differ in scope 
from the CCPA, previewing what is likely to become a complicated 
patchwork of laws with inconsistent or mutually exclusive requirements as 
more states enact their own privacy bills. 61  Compliance challenges for 
covered entities—especially tech companies—will only grow with the 
passage of each new state law, making a uniform federal bill imperative.62 
Today’s increasing calls for data-privacy regulation come as 
fundamental legal questions still remain unresolved: is personal data 
“speech” subject to First Amendment scrutiny, and, if so, what level of 
protection should it receive? Some scholars have argued that data-privacy 
 
Regulations on Data, S. 1951, 116th Cong. (2019); Information Transparency and Personal Data Control 
Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 56 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2446 (2019); Devin Coldewey, Vermont Passes First Law to Crack 
Down on Data Brokers, TECHCRUNCH (May 27, 2018, 2:17 PM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/05/27/vermont-passes-first-first-law-to-crack-down-on-data-brokers 
[https://perma.cc/YK62-CQJT]. Vermont’s data-privacy law requires data brokers to register with the 
government, to report on whether they allow individuals to opt out of having their data collected or sold, 
and, if applicable, to specify the categories the opt-out does and does not apply to. tit. 9, § 2446. 
57  See Andy Green, Complete Guide to Privacy Laws in the US, VARONIS (Mar. 29, 2020), 
https://www.varonis.com/blog/us-privacy-laws [https://perma.cc/HKZ2-GCYN] (“[T]he CCPA is the 
most comprehensive internet-focused data privacy legislation in the US, and with no equivalent at the 
federal level.”). 
 58 See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, .105, .120. The 
CCPA grants consumers a private right of action against businesses that fail “to implement and maintain 
reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information.” Id. § 1798.150. 
 59 ME. STAT. tit. 35-A, § 9301 (2019). Maine’s law imposes data-privacy requirements on internet 
service providers (ISPs), requiring them to obtain customer consent before they “use, disclose, sell or 
permit access” to consumer data. See An Act to Protect the Privacy of Online Customer Information, LD 
946, 129th Leg. (Me. 2019). ISPs are required to take “reasonable measures” to protect customers’ 
personal information from “unauthorized use, disclosure or access.” Id. 
 60 An Act Relating to Internet Privacy, SB 220, 80th Leg. (Nev. 2019). Nevada’s law prohibits an 
operator of internet websites and online services from selling “personally identifiable information” to a 
third party without consent if a consumer has requested the data not be sold, but includes several 
exemptions. See id. 
 61 Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Jason C. Gavejian & Maya Atrakchi, Maine and Nevada Sign into Law 
Consumer Privacy Laws, JACKSON LEWIS P.C. (July 3, 2019), https://www. 
workplaceprivacyreport.com/2019/07/articles/california-consumer-privacy-act/maine-and-nevada-sign-
into-law-consumer-privacy-laws [https://perma.cc/JT8K-SXJL]. 
 62 Id. 
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restrictions constitute an impermissible form of speech regulation. 63  The 
Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.64 does not 
resolve this issue entirely but brings at least some data sharing within the 
protection of the First Amendment, potentially threatening online data-
privacy regulations.65 A First Amendment lawsuit has already unfolded over 
Maine’s new data-privacy bill,66 representing what is likely to be one of 
many legal challenges to the tide of recently enacted state laws. 67 
Reconciling data privacy with the First Amendment is therefore a necessary 
precondition to the passage of a federal law. 
Among the proposed state and federal privacy laws are the New York 
Privacy Act68 and the Data Care Act.69 These acts embody an emerging strain 
of thought in privacy circles first introduced in 2014 by Yale Law professor 
Jack Balkin, 70  which advocates for imposing fiduciary duties on online 
 
 63 See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 86 (2014) (arguing that data 
should be protected by the First Amendment); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information 
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1049, 1050–53 (2000) (“This article is an attempt to consider, as concretely as possible, the possible 
unintended consequences of various justifications for information privacy speech restrictions. I ultimately 
conclude that these consequences are sufficiently troubling that I must reluctantly oppose such 
information privacy rules.”). 
 64 564 U.S. 552 (2011). In Sorrell, the Court held that a state statute restricting pharmaceutical 
marketers’ access to and use of prescription data for advertising purposes violated the First Amendment 
as it constituted a content-based and speaker-based restriction on access to information and on speech 
employed for marketing purposes. Id. at 557, 563–64, 571. 
 65 See, e.g., Agatha M. Cole, Internet Advertising After Sorrell v. IMS Health: A Discussion on Data 
Privacy & the First Amendment, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283, 307 (2012) (“Sorrell does not 
provide a bright-line rule to assess the scope of First Amendment protection applicable to data. Rather, 
the opinion reveals a majority that is more likely to engage in a nuanced analysis that places more 
emphasis on context than medium.”). 
 66 See Jon Brodkin, ISPs Sue Maine, Claim Web-Privacy Law Violates Their Free-Speech Rights, 
ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 18, 2020, 1:43 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/02/isps-sue-maine-
claim-web-privacy-law-violates-their-free-speech-rights [https://perma.cc/EEX5-3QPY]. On July 7, 
2020, a federal judge rejected the ISPs’ legal challenge, upholding Maine’s data-privacy law. See 
Gabrielle Mannino, Federal Judge Rules in Favor of Maine’s Landmark Internet Privacy Law, NEWS 
CTR. ME. (July 8, 2020, 11:09 AM), https://www.newscentermaine.com/article/news/local/federal-judge-
rules-in-favor-of-maines-landmark-internet-privacy-law/97-0100d331-86ab-4bd6-ba9d-6af83f492db9 
[https://perma.cc/PR5V-XGD6]. 
 67 See JENNIFER HUDDLESTON & IAN ADAMS, POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS IN STATE 
AND LOCAL DATA PRIVACY REGULATIONS 4 (2019), https://regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/RTP-
Cyber-and-Privacy-Paper-Constitutional-Conflicts-in-Data-Privacy-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9UX-
HFUV]. 
 68 See New York Privacy Act, S. 5642, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). 
 69 See Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. 
 70 See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries in the Digital Age, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 5, 2014, 
4:50 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-age.html [https:// 
perma.cc/VQU8-TZFF]. 
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service providers 71  that collect and utilize personal data. 72  Ever since, 
Professor Balkin has been associated with the term “information fiduciary,”73 
which he defines as “a person or business who, because of their relationship 
with another, has taken on special duties with respect to the information they 
obtain in the course of the relationship.”74 He argues that online service 
providers should be treated as information fiduciaries with respect to their 
end users, who entrust them with valuable personal information in exchange 
for their services.75 
Treating online service providers as information fiduciaries would 
reconcile the First Amendment with data-privacy regulation. The First 
Amendment has not prevented the government from regulating how certain 
professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, use their clients’ personal 
information, precisely because these professionals share a fiduciary 
relationship with their clients. 76  Therefore, consistent with the First 
Amendment, the government should be able to impose the same duties of 
care, loyalty, and confidentiality that define the traditional fiduciary 
relationship on online service providers.77 
Professors Lina Khan and David Pozen have criticized Professor 
Balkin’s proposal as an inadequate response to the structural power of online 
platforms, the problematic speech environment on social media, and the 
 
 71 In this Note, “online service providers” refers to social media platforms, ISPs, email, news and 
entertainment providers, search engines, e-commerce, online banking or health sites, and other entities 
that collect personal data from end users in exchange for services. 
 72 Press Release, Off. of Sen. Brian Schatz, Schatz Leads Group of 15 Senators in Introducing New 
Bill to Help Protect People’s Personal Data Online (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.schatz.senate.gov/press-
releases/schatz-leads-group-of-15-senators-in-introducing-new-bill-to-help-protect-peoples-personal-
data-online [https://perma.cc/B6E8-TB6A] (“By establishing a fiduciary duty for online providers, 
Americans can trust that their online data is protected and used in a responsible way.”); Issie Lapowsky, 
New York’s Privacy Bill Is Even Bolder than California’s, WIRED (June 4, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/new-york-privacy-act-bolder [https://perma.cc/7PK2-9C7A] (requiring 
New York businesses to act as “data fiduciaries,” which “would legally bar businesses from using data 
in a way that benefits their companies to the detriment of their users”). 
 73 See Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. 
REV. 497, 499 (2019) (“Professor Kenneth Laudon appears to have coined this phrase [information 
fiduciaries] in the early 1990s. Since 2014, it has been identified with Professor Jack Balkin, who has 
developed the idea over a series of papers.” (citation omitted)). 
 74 See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1183, 1209 (2016). 
 75 Id. at 1221–22. 
 76 Id. at 1219 (“Information about clients that is obtained in the course of fiduciary relationships is 
not public discourse. Therefore, when a fiduciary communicates private information about a client to the 
public, the communication does not receive standard First Amendment protection, unless the dependent 
person—the client—permits the information to enter public discourse.”). 
 77 See id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1842 
perverse economic incentives of targeted advertising. 78  Moreover, they 
challenge supporters of the information-fiduciary model to show what it adds 
to consumer-protection practices and why it should be viewed “as a 
promising path forward.”79 
This Note not only responds to Professors Khan and Pozen’s criticisms, 
but also demonstrates how Professor Balkin’s information-fiduciary 
approach can be applied to the issue of political microtargeting on digital 
platforms. Recognizing the limitations of Professor Balkin’s proposal, this 
Note advocates for the passage of federal legislation that would instill online 
service providers with fiduciary duties towards their end users, superseding 
any duty owed to their shareholders. This Note then spells out how these 
fiduciary duties would be enforced, using political microtargeting on 
Facebook as an example, while also providing a model for their application 
in the broader context of targeted commercial advertising. 
Part I lays out the main consequences associated with online political 
advertising, including voter manipulation, digital gerrymandering, and the 
exacerbation of social and political divisions. It then discusses why the 
traditional remedy for misleading or deceptive political ads—
counterspeech—is no longer effective. Part II describes the shortcomings of 
the current notice-and-choice approach to regulating data privacy and how 
the First Amendment remains a barrier to meaningful reform. Part III 
demonstrates how Professor Balkin’s information-fiduciary concept offers 
not only a viable approach for reconciling data privacy with the First 
Amendment, but also for responding to some of the most pressing challenges 
of our digital age. It begins with an overview of the fiduciary relationship, 
and then examines Professor Balkin’s theory, as well as Professors Khan and 
Pozen’s criticisms. Part III ends with a defense of the information-fiduciary 
approach to regulating data privacy. Part IV introduces a framework that 
applies Professor Balkin’s information-fiduciary concept to the issue of 
political microtargeting on digital platforms. It then shows how this 
framework is applicable with equal force in the commercial-advertising 
context. This Note ends by discussing why the misinformation surrounding 
COVID-19 and the results of the 2020 presidential election makes the need 
for data-privacy reform more urgent than ever before. 
 
 78 See Khan & Pozen, supra note 73, at 501–02, 540–41. 
 79 Id. at 541. 
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I. THE DANGERS OF POLITICAL MICROTARGETING 
The emergence of Big Data has revolutionized how political campaigns 
reach American voters. Through the combination of data-driven voter 
research and personalized advertising, political actors engage in political 
microtargeting on digital platforms. 80  Online platforms are a powerful 
instrument for influencing voters because they allow political ads to reach 
certain audiences while remaining unseen by others.81 But most voters are 
unaware of how political actors exploit their personal data. 82  This is 
especially troubling given the “disturbing new opportunities for political 
manipulation and other forms of antidemocratic strategic communication” 
created by today’s digital-advertising infrastructure. 83  Understanding the 
negative effects of political microtargeting on American democracy 
therefore proves vital to the development of an informed populace. This Part 
spotlights the main consequences associated with online political 
advertising, including voter manipulation, digital gerrymandering, and the 
exacerbation of social and political divisions. It then discusses why 
counterspeech—the traditional remedy for misleading or deceptive political 
ads—is no longer effective due to the opacity of political microtargeting. 
A. Voter Manipulation 
Although political campaigns have long used manipulative tactics to get 
their message out to voters, digital platforms have amplified the scope and 
power of these efforts, creating unprecedented opportunities for 
manipulation. 84  Today, campaigns weaponize digital-advertising 
technologies to target individuals who are most susceptible to strategic 
influence. 85  In essence, the personal data of American voters “is turned 
 
 80 Burkell & Regan, supra note 40, at 47. A political advertiser could utilize Facebook’s targeted 
advertising system to send a message only to Southern men without a college degree who earn less than 
$75,000. See Scott Rosenberg, How Online Ad Targeting Weaponizes Political Misinformation, AXIOS 
(Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.axios.com/online-ad-targeting-political-misinformation-3fac586c-2412-
4c2b-a9c9-cbd2d47de6f8.html [https://perma.cc/49YE-G7RK]. 
 81  See ANTHONY NADLER, MATTHEW CRAIN & JOAN DONOVAN, WEAPONIZING THE DIGITAL 
INFLUENCE MACHINE: THE POLITICAL PERILS OF ONLINE AD TECH 1 (2018) (“[D]ata-driven advertising 
allows political actors to zero in on those believed to be the most receptive and pivotal audience for very 
specific messages while also helping to minimize the risk of political blowback by limiting their visibility 
to those who might react negatively.”). 
 82  See Burkell & Regan, supra note 40, at 63 (“The hyper-individualised nature of online 
communication . . . means that message manipulations are difficult to detect. As a result, voters may be 
unaware that they are being subjected to invisible persuasion by unidentified actors.”). 
 83 NADLER ET AL., supra note 81, at 4. 
 84 See Ido Kilovaty, Legally Cognizable Manipulation, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449, 462 (2019). 
 85 Crain & Nadler, supra note 28, at 372. 
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against them and used to help political advertisers more effectively influence 
their targets.” 86  For instance, campaigns often resort to fear-mongering 
tactics, and “research shows that when afraid, only some people tend to 
become more conservative and vote for more conservative candidates.”87 But 
prior to digital advertising, campaigns had to target their fear-mongering 
messages to all voters (or at least a large subset), not just those likely to be 
receptive to such messages.88 With the help of Big Data, campaigns can now 
target voters individually by using tactics designed to exploit their 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities. 89  Political microtargeting also allows 
messages to more easily escape the notice “of the press and the . . . public, 
markedly increasing their power to mislead and misinform viewers with 
impunity.” 90  For example, a campaign can expose xenophobic voters to 
content about high crime rates among immigrants while evading political 
backlash from those more likely to respond negatively.91 
Political microtargeting on digital platforms thus presents heightened 
opportunities for voter manipulation that directly threaten citizens’ 
autonomy, undermining democracy in the process. “Personal autonomy is 
the capacity to make one’s own choices, with respect to both existential and 
everyday decisions.”92  “[A]utonomy lies at the normative core of liberal 
democracies,”93 as “democratic institutions are designed (ideally) to reflect 
autonomous decisions reached in the political sphere.”94 But when political 
campaigns target manipulative ads to those most vulnerable to influence, 
they attempt to circumvent voters’ “capacity for reflection and 
 
 86 Id. 
 87 Tufekci, supra note 36. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 William A. Gorton, Manipulating Citizens: How Political Campaigns’ Use of Behavioral Social 
Science Harms Democracy, 38 NEW POL. SCI. 61, 72 (2016). 
 91 See Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Judith Möller, Sanne Kruikemeier, Ronan Ó Fathaigh, 
Kristina Irion, Tom Dobber, Balazs Bodo & Claes de Vreese, Online Political Microtargeting: Promises 
and Threats for Democracy, 14 UTRECHT L. REV. 82, 87 (2018). Facebook—the digital platform 
responsible for most political microtargeting, see Gibson, supra note 51—recently vowed to ban ads that 
claim “people from a specific race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, caste, sexual 
orientation, gender identity or immigration status are a threat to the physical safety, health or survival of 
others.” Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (June 26, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/1011204
8980882521 [https://perma.cc/X8TU-7UUD]. Facebook has not yet implemented this policy, and there 
is no indication of how rigorously it will be enforced or whether it will prove effective.  
 92 Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in 
a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 35 (2019). 
93 Id.  
 94 Id. at 37. 
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deliberation.”95 Accordingly, political microtargeting has “clear implications 
for autonomy, which in turn has clear implications for democratic principles 
and practices.”96 
B. Digital Gerrymandering 
The problem of digital gerrymandering can arise either from the 
algorithmic design of online platforms themselves or from the deliberate 
targeting decisions made by political advertisers. The term “digital 
gerrymandering” was first coined in 2014 by cyber-law scholar Jonathan 
Zittrain to describe how easily social media platforms like Facebook could 
exploit Big Data analytics to manipulate voter behavior and turnout.97 In his 
provocative piece Engineering an Election, Professor Zittrain warns of the 
potential for digital platforms to engage in digital gerrymandering,98 which 
he defines as “the selective presentation of information by an intermediary 
to meet its agenda rather than to serve its users.”99 He asks us to imagine a 
“hotly contested future election” where Facebook decides to gerrymander its 
users by selectively sending get-out-the-vote messages to only those 
supportive of a certain political candidate. 100  But Professor Zittrain’s 
hypothetical threat is now a reality, as revealed by a recent study (Ali study) 
examining the impact of Facebook’s ad-delivery algorithms on political 
ads.101 
In the Ali study, a team of researchers ran a series of political ads on 
Facebook and tracked how they were delivered to different groups depending 
on the ad’s content and targeting criteria. They found that Facebook’s 
algorithms differentiate the price of reaching a user based on the user’s 
 
 95 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE: GOVERNMENT IN THE AGE OF BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCE 82 (2016) (emphasis removed). 
 96 Burkell & Regan, supra note 40, at 63. 
 97 Jonathan Zittrain, Response, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 335–36 (2014). 
On November 2, 2010, Facebook subjected over sixty million American users to an experiment to see 
whether it could get them to vote in the U.S. congressional midterm elections when they otherwise would 
not have gone to the polls. Id. at 335. The results of the experiment revealed that users who received get-
out-the-vote messages were 0.39% more likely to vote than users who did not receive them. Id. at 336. 
Researchers concluded this increased turnout directly by 60,000 voters and created a ripple effect that 
caused an additional 340,000 votes to be cast that day. Id. 
 98 “Digital gerrymandering” has a broader meaning than “traditional gerrymandering,” which more 
commonly refers to the manipulation of district boundaries to achieve an unfair political advantage for a 
certain party. 
 99 Zittrain, supra note 97, at 336. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Muhammad Ali, Piotr Sapiezynski, Aleksandra Korolova, Alan Mislove & Aaron Rieke, Ad 
Delivery Algorithms: The Hidden Arbiters of Political Messaging, ARXIV (Dec. 17, 2019), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.04255.pdf [https://perma.cc/CU2A-E3HG]. 
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inferred political alignment, which made it difficult for campaigns to reach 
voters across the political spectrum. 102  The study showed Facebook 
preferentially delivers ads to the users that it deems most “relevant,” making 
it “cheaper and more effective for a political campaign to reach audiences 
that are politically aligned (as inferred by Facebook) with their agenda.”103 
In essence, Facebook’s algorithms make it more expensive for campaigns to 
get their message in front of users who do not already agree with them 
because Facebook yields a greater profit the longer users engage with 
content, revealing the extent to which polarization is an inextricable part of 
Facebook’s business model.104 This finding not only shows that Facebook’s 
algorithms amplify social and political divisions—as explored in the next 
Section—but also demonstrates how Facebook’s ad-delivery system engages 
in digital gerrymandering by pushing ads towards those already interested in 
the ad’s content to “meet its agenda” of boosting profits “rather than to serve 
its users.”105 
A second type of digital gerrymandering can result from the deliberate 
choices made by political advertisers when sending out targeted ads. 
Researchers have shown that advertisers may exploit the advanced targeting 
features on Facebook to intentionally target or exclude users belonging to 
certain sensitive groups—a problem that still exists despite Facebook’s 
decision to omit attributes such as “ethnic affinity” when sending ads related 
to housing, employment, or financial services. 106  In 2016, the Trump 
campaign was accused of using Facebook’s targeting features to suppress 
Black votes by delivering negative Hillary Clinton ads to millions of 
African-American voters.107 Moreover, the ability of political advertisers to 
 
 102  Id. The researchers found that “Facebook delivers our ads with content from Democratic 
campaigns to over 65% users registered as Democrats, while delivering ads from Republican campaigns 
to under 40% users registered as Democrats, despite identical targeting parameters.” Id. 
 103 Id. The study found that it cost more to reach users across the political divide, costing 50%  more 
to get a conservative voter to see Bernie Sanders content than Donald Trump content. Id. 
 104 Gilad Edelman, How Facebook’s Political Ad System Is Designed to Polarize, WIRED (Dec. 13, 
2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-political-ad-system-designed-polarize/ 
[https://perma.cc/258P-VSVM]. 
 105 Zittrain, supra note 97, at 336. 
 106  See Till Speicher, Muhammad Ali, Giridhari Venkatadri, Filipe Nunes Ribeiro, George 
Arvanitakis, Fabrício Benevenuto, Krishna P. Gummadi, Patrick Loiseau & Alan Mislove, Potential for 
Discrimination in Online Targeted Advertising, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 1, 2, 14 (2018) 
(finding that despite banning the use of sensitive attributes such as ethnic affinity, “a malicious advertiser” 
can still “leverage the different targeting methods offered by platforms like Facebook to target users in a 
discriminatory manner”). 
 107 Philip Bump, What We Know About Alleged Efforts by Trump’s 2016 Campaign to Suppress 
Black Votes, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2020, 3:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/0
9/29/what-we-know-about-efforts-by-trumps-2016-campaign-suppress-black-votes [https://perma.cc/ 
115:1829 (2021) Information Fiduciaries and Political Microtargeting 
1847 
exclude unlikely voters from their advertising altogether “means that a 
strategy of focusing Presidential politics on ‘swing states’ can be 
implemented at an individual level.”108 In other words, “[a] home judged as 
a ‘non–voter’ can be skipped while the next one will be flooded with 
campaign material, thus introducing a new form of categorical inequality 
into the public sphere.”109 
In sum, digital gerrymandering can lead to voter suppression as well as 
to political campaigns ignoring entire subsets of the population deemed 
irrelevant to either the bottom line of the social media platform or the 
electoral chances of the political candidate. As a result, certain voters are 
discouraged to vote or purposefully underinformed and underrepresented in 
our democratic process.110 
C. Social and Political Divisions 
Political microtargeting also exacerbates social and political divisions. 
Social media ad systems “incentivize campaigns to not only target their 
messages, but to target them in ways that would further inflame and polarize 
opinions.” 111  The Ali study shows how Facebook charges political 
advertisers a premium to reach audiences who are not already politically 
aligned with their party, disincentivizing campaigns to reach across party 
lines.112 The algorithms of digital platforms such as Facebook are therefore 
designed to reinforce, rather than challenge, preexisting beliefs and 
stereotypes, deepening social and political divisions in our country.113 
Furthermore, the opacity of political microtargeting has given rise to “a 
new type of ‘dog whistle’ politics, whereby a campaign emphasizes a 
provocative position only to sympathetic audiences, while remaining 
invisible to others.”114 This has made the prevalence of wedge issues all the 
 
56Q3-FULT]. For instance, to discourage African Americans from voting, the Trump campaign directed 
the animation “Hillary Thinks African Americans Are Super Predators” to certain African-American 
voters on Facebook. Id. 
 108 Tufekci, supra note 36. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Borgesius et al., supra note 91, at 87–88. 
 111 See Casey Newton, How Facebook Rewards Polarizing Political Ads, THE VERGE (Oct. 11, 2017, 
12:38 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/11/16449976/facebook-political-ads-trump-russia-
election-news-feed [https://perma.cc/AJ33-22RE]. 
 112 Ali et al., supra note 101; see also Edelman, supra note 104. 
 113  Minow, supra note 27, at 536 (“Amplifying prior views and predicted interests, the 
communication within social networks facilitated by digital companies may contribute to social division 
and polarization, even before enemies of the United States exploit them.”). 
 114 Tufekci, supra note 36. 
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more damaging as it enables campaigns to ignore “important but broadly 
relevant topics” such as the economy and education, and focus instead “on 
issues that can mobilize small, but crucial, segments.”115  For instance, a 
campaign wanting “to inflame feelings among rural and exurban 
communities that they are being looked down upon by urban elites” is now 
able to do so with increasing ease.116 COVID-19 quickly developed into a 
major wedge issue for Democrats and Republicans who flooded social media 
with diametrically opposed ads about the nation’s response to the pandemic, 
producing only “communicative confusion” over the severity of the virus 
itself. 117  Ultimately, digital political advertising, whether due to the 
algorithmic design of digital platforms or the deliberate efforts of political 
actors to exploit wedge issues, continues to inflame social and political 
divisions, weakening the stability of our democracy. 
D. The Limited Efficacy of Counterspeech 
The myriad harms associated with today’s digital-advertising 
infrastructure highlight the extent to which counterspeech—the traditional 
remedy for false or deceptive speech in politics118—no longer serves as an 
adequate remedy in our increasingly fragmented and data-driven media 
environment.119 A core “tenet of the First Amendment is that more speech is 
an effective remedy against the dissemination and consumption of false 
speech.”120 One of the assumptions underlying the counterspeech doctrine is 
that a significant portion of people exposed to false or misleading 
information will also be exposed to true or reliable information.121 But the 
design of digital platforms prevents this type of exposure to counterspeech.122 
Through political microtargeting, political actors can send targeted messages 
 
 115 Id. 
 116 Crain & Nadler, supra note 28, at 379–80. 
 117 Harry Dodsworth, Federalism and Communicative Confusion in the Time of COVID-19, NW. U. 
L. REV. NOTE (June 4, 2020), https://blog.northwesternlaw.review/?p=1453 [https://perma.cc/4YVZ-
CKCL]; Yelena Mejova & Kyriaki Kalimeri, COVID-19 on Facebook Ads: Competing Agendas Around 
a Public Health Crisis, COMPASS ’20: PROCS. 3D ACM SIGCAS CONF. COMPUTING & SUSTAINABLE 
SOC’YS 22, 29–30 (2020). 
 118 See sources cited supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 119 See Dawn Carla Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 
1521 (2019) (“[T]oday’s online marketplace of ideas is besieged by the increased polarization and siloing 
of thought and opinion, which renders Holmes’s prescribed remedy for harmful speech—
counterspeech—increasingly ineffective.”). 
 120 Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First Amendment Theory 
Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 55, 58 (2018). 
 121 Id. at 61. 
 122 Id. at 77. 
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to the most influenceable voters while hiding those messages from 
individuals likely to respond negatively. 123  The opaque nature of online 
political advertising is only exacerbated by digital platforms’ algorithms, 
which push ads toward users already interested in their content, reducing 
exposure to political ads from across the aisle.124 The limited efficacy of 
counterspeech within the context of political microtargeting demonstrates 
the importance of regulating data privacy to adequately respond to the harms 
associated with digital political advertising. 
II. REGULATING DATA PRIVACY: THE CURRENT  
NOTICE-AND-CHOICE REGIME 
Despite the importance of regulating data privacy, especially in the 
context of digital political advertising, the First Amendment remains a major 
barrier to reform. Many scholars maintain that any attempt to regulate the 
flow of personal data impermissibly restricts speech.125 Leading “the ‘First 
Amendment critique’ of data privacy” is Professor Eugene Volokh. 126 
According to Professor Volokh, “[T]he right to information privacy—my 
right to control your communication of personally identifiable information 
about me—is a right to have the government stop you from speaking about 
me.”127 He contends that any governmental regulation that restricts speakers’ 
ability to communicate truthful data about other people is inconsistent with 
the First Amendment.128 Professor Volokh concludes that “restrictions on 
 
123 See supra Section I.A. 
 124 See Napoli, supra note 120, at 79 (explaining how the assumptions that underlie “[t]raditional 
approaches to counterspeech . . . . [are] at best quaint, and at worst utterly anachronistic, when applied to 
today’s media environment of intertwined individual and algorithmic content filtering, in which filter 
bubbles have been constructed in ways that often are fundamentally oriented toward deflecting 
counterspeech”). 
 125 See, e.g., FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 71 (1997) (“Any government effort 
to protect privacy . . . faces significant First Amendment obstacles.”); SOLVEIG SINGLETON, CATO INST. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS, PRIVACY AS CENSORSHIP: A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF PROPOSALS TO REGULATE PRIVACY 
IN THE PRIVACY SECTOR 3 (1998) (“Regulations intended to protect privacy by outlawing or restricting 
the transfer of consumer information would violate rights of free speech.”). 
 126 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 
1151 (2005) (defining “the ‘First Amendment critique’ of data privacy” as the belief that “any right of 
‘data privacy’ is in direct conflict with the First Amendment because any attempt to regulate the flow of 
personal data would inevitably require the government to impose unconstitutional restrictions on 
speech”). 
 127 Volokh, supra note 63, at 1050–51. 
 128 See id. at 1051. For a more recent First Amendment critique of data-privacy laws, see Bambauer, 
supra note 63, at 60–61, which argues that “freedom of speech carries an implicit right to create 
knowledge” and that when “the state regulates information precisely because it informs people, the 
regulation rouses the First Amendment.” 
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speech that reveals personal information are constitutional under current 
doctrine only if they are imposed by contract, express or implied.”129 This 
contract-based approach to data privacy echoes what has now become a 
“hallmark of modern American privacy law[:] its reliance on a control-based 
regime of ‘notice and choice.’”130 
A. Notice and Choice 
Underlying the current notice-and-choice regime of privacy law is the 
assumption that individuals can sufficiently handle and protect their own 
personal data through “privacy self-management.” 131  The central 
components of privacy self-management are, first, notifying “individuals 
about the data collected and used about them (notice)” and then allowing 
individuals to choose whether or not to acquiesce to such collection and use 
(choice). 132  Privacy self-management originated in the Fair Information 
Practices (FIPs) developed in response to the rise of electronic databases.133 
“The FIPs represent a common understanding of the principles that 
organizations should follow to provide individuals with appropriate controls 
over the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal data, safeguard this 
data against security threats, and establish accountability measures that give 
effect to these principles.”134 
Privacy notices and the choice to opt out of certain types of data 
collection and uses are common features of modern privacy regulation.135 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has enforced privacy notice 
 
 129 Volokh, supra note 63, at 1122. 
 130 Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 431, 434 (2016). 
 131 Id. at 444; see also Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-management and the Consent 
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880 (2013) (“Under the current approach, the law provides people 
with a set of rights to enable them to make decisions about how to manage their data. These rights consist 
primarily of rights to notice, access, and consent regarding the collection, use, and disclosure of personal 
data.”). 
 132 Solove, supra note 131, at 1883. 
 133 The FIPs were derived from a 1973 privacy report by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) in response to the growing use of automated data systems by public and private 
sector organizations. The report identified a “Code of Fair Information Practice” consisting of five core 
principles designed to protect the personal data these organizations were collecting. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DHEW PUB. NO. (OS) 73-94, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF 
CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA 
SYSTEMS, at vi, xix–xxiii (1973). 
 134 Ira S. Rubinstein, Voter Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 861, 869. 
 135 See Solove, supra note 131, at 1883–84. 
115:1829 (2021) Information Fiduciaries and Political Microtargeting 
1851 
requirements since the late 1990s,136 finding breaches of such requirements 
to constitute “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” 
in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.137 For instance, if the FTC 
detects a privacy violation, it can bring civil actions and seek injunctive 
remedies against the company at fault.138 However, so long as companies 
notify consumers about their data collection, use, and disclosure practices in 
their privacy policies and give individuals the choice to opt out, they are free 
to exploit end-user data however they please.139 
To scholars like Professor Volokh, privacy self-management is 
consistent with the First Amendment insofar as contract law protects users 
from companies that betray their own privacy policies with respect to their 
collection, use, and sale of personal data.140 While Professor Volokh views 
privacy protection secured by contract to be constitutionally sound, he argues 
that “broader information privacy rules are not easily defensible under 
existing free speech law.”141 
However, many privacy scholars warn that relying solely on a notice-
and-choice approach to privacy protection seriously underprotects people’s 
privacy. 142  In the words of former FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz, 
“[C]onsumers don’t notice, read, or understand . . . privacy policies.”143 A 
 
 136 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585 (2014). 
 137 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).  
 138 See id. § 45(l)–(m). In June 2016, the FTC fined the advertising company InMobi $950,000 for 
violating its own privacy policy. See Press Release, FTC, Mobile Advertising Network InMobi Settles 
FTC Charges It Tracked Hundreds of Millions of Consumers’ Locations Without Permission (June 22, 
2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/06/mobile-advertising-network-inmobi-set 
tles-ftc-charges-it-tracked [https://perma.cc/ACY5-P432]. 
 139 Richards & Hartzog, supra note 130, at 444 (“The most salient example of th[e] notice and choice 
regime is the ubiquitous privacy policy, that dense, unreadable, boilerplate text tucked away in some 
corner of virtually every website and application on the Internet.”). 
 140 See Volokh, supra note 63, at 1061 (finding no First Amendment problems with the government 
“simply enforcing obligations that the would-be speaker has himself assumed”). 
 141 Id. at 1051. 
 142 See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 341, 360–61 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) 
(explaining that privacy policies are long, difficult to understand, and rarely read); Daniel J. Solove, 
Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
1393, 1426–27 (2001) (“People must relinquish personal data to gain employment, procure insurance, 
obtain a credit card, or otherwise participate like a normal citizen in today’s economy. Consent is virtually 
meaningless in many contexts. When people give consent, they must often consent to a total surrender of 
control over their information.”). 
 143  Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, FTC, Remarks at the FTC Town Hall Meeting on “Ehavioral 
Advertising: Tracking, Targeting & Technology”: So Private, So Public: Individuals, the Internet & the 
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study conducted by researchers at Carnegie Mellon revealed that it would 
take an average internet user seventy-six work days to review every privacy 
policy encountered over a year.144 And even if consumers were to read the 
privacy policies they encounter on a daily basis, individuals often fail to 
conceptualize the value of their data and the consequences of giving it up.145 
Another study led by privacy journalist Julia Angwin found that choosing to 
opt out of data collection is practically akin to opting out of modern society, 
given the ubiquity of data surveillance in everyday life.146 
Acclaimed privacy scholar Daniel Solove cogently summarizes the 
major problems plaguing privacy self-management as follows: 
(1) people do not read privacy policies; (2) if people read them, they do not 
understand them; (3) if people read and understand them, they often lack 
enough background knowledge to make an informed choice; and (4) if people 
read them, understand them, and can make an informed choice, their choice 
might be skewed by various decisionmaking difficulties.147 
Accordingly, any “assumption that users have actual notice or meaningful 
choice is an illusion.”148 
B. The First Amendment Barrier 
The inherent shortcomings of notice and choice highlight the 
inadequacy of privacy self-management and fuel demands for reform. 
However, the Supreme Court has so far embraced a more limited 
understanding of data privacy. In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., one of its most 
recent rulings on data privacy, the Court struck down regulations limiting the 
communication and distribution of personal data about doctors.149 Justice 
 
Paradox of Behavioral Marketing 4 (Nov. 1, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/p
ublic_statements/so-private-so-public-individuals-internet-paradox-behavioral-marketing/071031ehavio 
r_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/E65D-5RS8]. 
 144 Alexis C. Madrigal, Reading the Privacy Policies You Encounter in a Year Would Take 76 Work 
Days, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/reading-the-
privacy-policies-youencounter-in-a-year-would-take-76-work-days/253851 [https://perma.cc/X3YU-
Y34N]; see also George R. Milne & Mary J. Culnan, Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy Risks: Why 
Consumers Read (or Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices, 18 J. INTERACTIVE MKTG. 15, 20 (2004) 
(finding only 4.5% of respondents always read website privacy notices and 14.1% frequently read them). 
 145  M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1149 (2011) (“Many 
consumers have little idea how much of their information they are giving up or how it will be used.”). 
 146 See JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A 
WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 153–67 (2014); see also Richards & Hartzog, supra note 130, at 
444–45 (describing Julia Angwin as a leading privacy journalist). 
 147 Solove, supra note 131, at 1888. 
 148 Richards & Hartzog, supra note 130, at 444. 
 149 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011). 
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Anthony Kennedy held the regulations unconstitutional because they served 
as content- and speaker-based restrictions on access to information and on 
speech utilized for marketing purposes.150 While Justice Kennedy ultimately 
found it unnecessary to decide the question of whether data is protected 
speech under the First Amendment, his dicta characterizing the creation and 
dissemination of prescriber-identifying information as speech may be 
indicative of the Court’s more narrow conception of data privacy.151 
Especially in light of Sorrell, the First Amendment serves as a 
significant roadblock to the passage of any comprehensive federal privacy 
bill. A lawsuit already played out over Maine’s new data-privacy law,152 
which prohibits certain internet companies from selling personal 
information, such as a customer’s web-browsing history, geolocation data, 
and financial and health data, without the express consent of the customer.153 
While ultimately unsuccessful, the Maine lawsuit nevertheless represents 
what is likely to become one of many legal challenges to the recent wave of 
state data-privacy bills, demonstrating the importance of reconciling data 
privacy with the First Amendment.154 
III. INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES AS THE VIABLE PATH FORWARD 
Professor Balkin’s information-fiduciary theory offers an effective 
framework for reconciling data privacy with the First Amendment. He 
contends that online service providers are information fiduciaries because 
users entrust them with sensitive information in exchange for their 
services.155 As a result “of their special power over others and their special 
relationships to others,” Professor Balkin argues that “information 
fiduciaries have special duties to act in ways that do not harm the interests 
of the people whose information they collect, analyze, use, sell, and 
distribute.”156 To understand Professor Balkin’s information-fiduciary theory 
 
 150 See id. at 563–64. Laws or regulations that are directed at certain content or aimed at particular 
speakers are presumptively invalid under the First Amendment and subject to heightened scrutiny. Id. at 
567–71.  
 151 Id. at 570–71 (“Facts, after all, are the beginning point for much of the speech that is most 
essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human affairs. There is thus a strong argument 
that prescriber-identifying information is speech for First Amendment purposes.”). 
 152 See Brodkin, supra note 66. 
 153 See An Act to Protect the Privacy of Online Customer Information, LD 946, 129th Leg. (Me. 
2019). 
 154 HUDDLESTON & ADAMS, supra note 67, at 12 (“In the absence of such a [federal] framework, not 
only will state laws fray the internet via a regulatory patchwork, but they will do so at the risk of creating 
tremendous legal uncertainty in the face of well-founded constitutional challenges.”). 
 155 See Balkin, supra note 74, at 1221. 
 156 Id. at 1186. 
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and its implications for data-privacy regulation, it is important to first begin 
with an overview of the fiduciary relationship. 
A. Defining the Fiduciary Relationship 
“[A] fiduciary is an actor whom one should be able to trust to be loyal 
to one’s interests.” 157  While definitions vary, “[a] fiduciary relationship 
exists when one person places trust and confidence in another who, as a 
result, gains influence and superiority over the other.” 158  “Fiduciary 
relationships stem from or create disparities of power and information, such 
that the relationship’s beneficiary is or becomes vulnerable to the actor who 
occupies the fiduciary role.”159 Classic examples of fiduciary relationships 
include those between trustees and beneficiaries,160 agents and principals,161 
lawyers and clients,162 and doctors and patients.163 Fiduciaries may manage 
property or money, or perform professional services for their beneficiaries, 
principals, or clients.164  However, in nearly every instance, the fiduciary 
collects sensitive personal information that can be used to the beneficiary’s 
disadvantage.165 Because of the asymmetries of power and information that 
exist between the fiduciary and the beneficiary, “the main purpose of 
 
 157 Deborah A. DeMott, Relationships of Trust and Confidence in the Workplace, 100 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1255, 1259 (2015); see also TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 25 (2011) (“To perform their 
services, fiduciaries must be entrusted with various amounts of valuable assets and various degrees of 
discretion (power).” (emphasis added)). 
 158 Kurtz v. Solomon, 656 N.E.2d 184, 190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); see also Calvin Klein Trademark 
Tr. v. Wachner, 123 F. Supp. 2d 731, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that fiduciary relationships can arise 
“when one party’s superior position or superior access to confidential information is so great as virtually 
to require the other party to repose trust and confidence in the first party”). 
 159 DeMott, supra note 157, at 1259 (citation omitted). 
 160  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 77–79 (AM. L. INST. 2007) (outlining the core 
fiduciary duties owed by trustees to their beneficiaries, including the duties of prudence, loyalty, and 
impartiality). 
 161 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (“An agent has a fiduciary 
duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.”). 
 162 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 7 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2000) 
(“The relationship between lawyer and client is one in which the lawyer generally owes the client 
rigorously enforced fiduciary duties, including duties of utmost good faith and fair dealing.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 163  See e.g., S. SANDY SANBAR, ALLAN GIBOFSKY, MARVIN H. FIRESTONE & THEODORE R. 
LEBLANG, LEGAL MEDICINE 257 (4th ed. 1998) (“The relationship between patient and physician is one 
known to the law as a ‘fiduciary relationship’ . . . .”); Peter Bartlett, Doctors as Fiduciaries: Equitable 
Regulation of the Doctor–Patient Relationship, 5 MED. L. REV. 193, 199 (1997) (“[F]iduciary issues 
between doctors and patients are based in . . . the use or availability of information about the 
patient . . . .”). 
 164 Balkin, supra note 74, at 1207. 
 165 See id. at 1207–08. 
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fiduciary law[] [is] to prohibit fiduciaries from misappropriating or misusing 
entrusted property or power.”166 
Traditional fiduciary relationships also give rise to the core duties of 
care, loyalty, and confidentiality. The duty of care is the duty to act 
competently and diligently by exercising an appropriate level of skill and 
prudence. 167  This is a positive duty that requires the fiduciary to use 
reasonable effort and diligence to promote the ends of the beneficiary.168 The 
duty of loyalty is the duty to act in the beneficiary’s best interest, rather than 
the fiduciary’s own interest.169 The duty of loyalty is a negative duty not to 
harm the beneficiary and to avoid conflicts of interest. 170  The duty of 
confidentiality is the duty to maintain the trust and confidence of the 
beneficiary and is intertwined with the duty of loyalty.171 Under the duty of 
confidentiality, the fiduciary must exercise proper discretion and avoid 
wrongful disclosure of valuable or sensitive information collected from the 
beneficiary.172 Finally, informed consent represents a critical aspect of the 
fiduciary relationship,173 particularly in the medical profession.174 To ensure 
 
 166 FRANKEL, supra note 157, at 108. 
 167 In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc., 160 B.R. 792, 797 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993) (“The duty of care 
requires a director to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily careful and prudent person would 
exercise under the same or similar circumstances.”). 
 168 See Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
75, 120 (2004) (“The fiduciary’s duty of care . . . requires affirmative conduct to act in the principal’s 
interest with respect to the assets or affairs of the principal entrusted to the fiduciary.”). 
 169 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2007) (“[A] trustee must refrain, 
whether in fiduciary or personal dealings with third parties, from transactions in which it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the trustee’s future fiduciary conduct might be influenced by considerations other than 
the best interests of the beneficiaries.”). 
 170 Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he duty of loyalty[] 
derives from the prohibition against self-dealing that inheres in the fiduciary relationship.”); Laby, supra 
note 168, at 120 (“[T]he duty of loyalty . . . requires negative conduct . . . .”). 
 171 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. i (AM. L. INST. 2007) (“Incident to the duty of 
loyalty . . . is the trustee’s duty to preserve the confidentiality and privacy of trust information from 
disclosure to third persons . . . .”). 
 172 See, e.g., Djowharzadeh v. City Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 646 P.2d 616, 619–20 (Okla. App. 1982) 
(finding a “[b]ank’s relationship to a loan applicant implicitly imposes the duty to keep the contents of 
loan applications confidential”); Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 676, 679–80 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (finding a 
psychiatrist liable for breach of privacy, arising from the duty of confidentiality, for publication of a book 
containing disclosures about a patient during the course of psychotherapy). 
 173 See, e.g., Kalled v. Albee, 712 A.2d 616, 618 (N.H. 1998) (“Failure to obtain a client’s informed 
consent constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty and a violation of public policy . . . .”); Moore v. Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (“‘[T]he patient’s consent to treatment, to be effective, 
must be an informed consent,’ . . . . [and] a physician has a fiduciary duty to disclose all information 
material to the patient’s decision.” (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972))). 
 174 The doctrine of informed consent requires that a physician disclose material facts relevant to the 
patient’s decision about treatment. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780–83 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1856 
that the beneficiary’s interests are preserved, fiduciaries must obtain 
informed consent before engaging in actions that run counter to other core 
duties.175 
Over time, fiduciary law has developed and expanded 176  to 
accommodate new relationships in areas such as family law, corporate law, 
agency law, banking law, employment law, and charities law.177 Professor 
Balkin argues that today’s digital economy calls for the recognition of a new 
type of fiduciary: online service providers.178 
B. Balkin’s Information-Fiduciary Theory 
Professor Balkin finds that online service providers present many of the 
familiar problems that give rise to traditional fiduciary obligations.179 First, 
much like an estate manager handles valuable assets, or a doctor manages 
sensitive patient records, online service providers collect personal 
information that is both highly valuable180 and sensitive.181 Second, like the 
disparities in power and expertise that exist between corporate directors and 
their shareholders, or lawyers and their clients, significant asymmetries of 
power and information are also apparent between online service providers 
 
(describing how a “physician is under an obligation to communicate specific information to the patient 
when the exigencies of reasonable care call for it”); Thompson v. Gerowitz, 944 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2011) (“Lack of informed consent is a distinct theory of liability premised on the physician’s duty 
to disclose to the patient material facts relevant to the patient’s decision about treatment.”). 
 175 See, e.g., ANN. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT § 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (stating a lawyer 
must receive each affected client’s informed consent to representation when a conflict of interest exists 
with a current client); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 & cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2006) (stating 
an agent must receive a principal’s consent, among other requirements, to engage in conduct “that would 
otherwise constitute a breach of duty”). 
176 See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 796 (1983) (“The twentieth century 
is witnessing an unprecedented expansion and development of the fiduciary law.”). 
 177 See Tamar Frankel, The Rise of Fiduciary Law 9 (B.U. Sch. of L. Pub. L. Rsch. Paper No. 18-18, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3237023 [https://perma.cc/D67Y-NG4K] (“Fiduciary relationships rise 
with (i) the dependence by people (entrustors) on the expertise of others (servicers) and (ii) the inability 
of the dependent persons to check the quality of the expertise and honesty of the servicers.”). 
 178 Balkin, supra note 74, at 1221–22. 
 179 Id. 
 180 See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, supra note 130, at 468 (“Personal information is valuable. In the 
technology industry, it is commonplace to state that ‘data is the new oil,’ meaning a fundamental source 
of value in the information economy.”); Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for 
the Costs of the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 634 (2014) (“[O]nline firms’ 
business models recognize the current and potential future value of consumers’ personal information.”). 
 181 Sophisticated data-mining techniques are used to deduce extensive information about individuals 
who share even the most innocuous pieces of data. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 131, at 1889–90 
(discussing how innocuous pieces of data can “[u]nexpectedly . . . be combined and analyzed to reveal 
sensitive facts”). For instance, social media and online behavioral-tracking information can be used to 
predict personality traits as well as IQ and political affiliation. See Matz & Netzer, supra note 22, at 8. 
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and their end users.182 Third, just as patients and clients depend on doctors 
and lawyers for the provision of critical medical or legal services, end users 
rely upon many of the services offered by digital platforms to participate and 
stay connected in the digital age.183 Fourth, similar to doctors and lawyers 
who present themselves as reliable protectors of patient or client information, 
online service providers present themselves as trustworthy data collectors 
with benevolent motives, promising to deliver personalized content designed 
to optimize the user experience184 and foster community and the spread of 
diverse voices and ideas online.185 
In sum, just as fiduciary law imposes duties of care, loyalty, and 
confidentiality on estate managers, corporate directors, doctors, and lawyers, 
it follows that the law should also impose these special duties on digital 
platforms—like Facebook, Google, and Twitter—that exploit the personal 
data of their end users.186  Such an approach allows for reconciling data 
privacy with the First Amendment.187 
C. Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment 
Professor Balkin argues that there is an important distinction between 
speech that falls within public discourse, which receives standard First 
Amendment protection, and speech that falls outside of public discourse, 
which receives less protection. 188  This distinction depends not “on the 
content of the speech,” but “on a characterization of social relationships.”189 
 
 182 See Jennifer Shkabatur, The Global Commons of Data, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 354, 370 (2019) 
(describing concerns with “the immense information asymmetry between data platform companies and 
their users, and the obscure nature of the algorithms’ operation”); Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: 
Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 83 (2015) 
(stating that Big Data “introduces substantial new asymmetries of knowledge and power”). 
 183 See ANGWIN, supra note 146, at 153–67. 
 184 See sources cited supra notes 1–7, 34 and accompanying text. 
 185 See sources cited supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 186 See Balkin, supra note 74, at 1226–27. 
 187 The designation of online service providers as information fiduciaries is compatible with § 230 
of the Communications and Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, which has long shielded online service 
providers from lawsuits based on content provided by third parties. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., REGULATING 
BIG TECH: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 1 (Sept. 11, 2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/L
SB10309 [https://perma.cc/UM7C-43SQ]. But § 230 does not shield them from other forms of liability, 
such as privacy violations. See Natasha Singer & Mike Issac, Facebook to Pay $550 Million to Settle 
Facial Recognition Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/technology/
facebook-privacy-lawsuit-earnings.html [https://perma.cc/TW5U-6WUY]. 
 188 Balkin, supra note 74, at 1212–14. Professor Balkin defines public discourse as “the processes of 
communication through which ideas and opinions circulate in a community to produce public opinion.” 
Id. at 1210. 
 189 Id. at 1214. 
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When people participate in public discourse, “the law presumes that they are 
free, independent, and autonomous,” and does not permit “restrictions on the 
dissemination of ideas and opinions.”190 But when people engage in speech 
outside of “public discourse, the law drops its assumption that everyone is 
equally able, independent, and knowledgeable.”191 Because “fiduciary law 
assume[s] that professionals and their clients do not stand on equal 
footing,”192 it “does not treat speech in . . . fiduciary relationships as part of 
public discourse,” but rather “as part of ordinary social and economic activity 
that is subject to reasonable regulation.”193 Professor Balkin provides the 
example of a lawyer or doctor who decides to run for office and who “reveals 
embarrassing information about clients to bolster his or her electoral 
chances,” explaining: “Even though the content of the speech is political and 
its purpose is political, the speech is not immune from regulation, because it 
is an abuse of a confidential relationship in which the candidate was an 
information fiduciary.”194 
To further support his claim that the First Amendment treats speech in 
fiduciary relationships differently, Professor Balkin cites to four state court 
cases that recognize a doctor’s duty not to disclose patient information.195 He 
also points to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lowe v. SEC196 as signaling 
“that ordinary First Amendment doctrine—including even the ban on prior 
restraints—would not apply to communications between” certain 
professional fiduciaries and their beneficiaries.197 Accordingly, he posits that 
treating online service providers as information fiduciaries provides a viable 
means for regulating their collection and use of personal data without 
violating the First Amendment.198 
 
 190 Id. at 1214–15. 
 191 Id. at 1215. 
192 Id. at 1216. 
 193 Id. at 1217. 
 194 Id. at 1219. 
 195 Id. at 1210 n.120 (first citing Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 676 (Sup. Ct. 1977); then citing 
Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 829–30 (Ala. 1973); then citing Cannell v. Med. & Surgical Clinic, 
315 N.E.2d 278, 280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); and then citing McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 439 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1997)). 
 196 472 U.S. 181, 210–11 (1985) (upholding the right of people not registered as investment advisors 
to publish newsletters that offer advice about securities to the general public, but implying that Congress 
may treat investment advisors as fiduciaries if such communications developed “into the kind of fiduciary, 
person-to-person relationships . . . that are characteristic of investment adviser–client relationships”). 
 197 See Balkin, supra note 74, at 1219. 
 198 See id. at 1225. 
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D. Criticisms of the Information-Fiduciary Approach 
Professor Balkin’s information-fiduciary theory has attracted praise 
from many scholars. 199  Lawmakers have also endorsed his approach, 
introducing legislation at both the federal 200  and state level 201  that 
incorporates his information-fiduciary concept. Despite garnering support in 
academic and political circles, Professor Balkin’s model has been met with 
skepticism by Professors Lina Khan and David Pozen. 
Professors Khan and Pozen have characterized his theory as an inapt 
response to the “business model . . . [and] outsized market share” of digital 
platforms.202 One of their main criticisms is that several of the purported 
information fiduciaries, such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter, are 
Delaware corporations, and under Delaware corporate law, these companies 
“already owe fiduciary duties [] to the corporation and its stockholders.”203 
Professors Khan and Pozen argue that today’s leading social media 
“companies may be put in the untenable position of having to violate their 
fiduciary duties (to stockholders) under Delaware law in order to fulfill their 
fiduciary duties (to end users) under the new body of law that Balkin 
proposes.” 204  The authors claim that digital companies like Facebook, 
Google, and Twitter would prove unable to manage the divided loyalties 
owed to their stockholders and end users, thus casting doubt on the 
practicability of the information-fiduciary model.205 
 
 199  See, e.g., ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN 
INFORMATION AGE 85 (2018) (endorsing the information-fiduciary model as an alternative to a “notice-
and-choice” regime); Peter C. Ormerod, A Private Enforcement Remedy for Information Misuse, 60 B.C. 
L. REV. 1893, 1934 (2019) (“The information fiduciary frame provides perhaps the strongest possible 
footing for users to reassert control over how businesses use—and misuse—their information.”); Alicia 
Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law Approach for Data 
Breaches, 127 YALE L.J.F. 614, 625 (2018) (“[D]ata holders are properly understood as a subtype of what 
Jack Balkin calls ‘information fiduciaries.’”). 
 200 Data Care Act, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018); see also Press Release, supra note 72 (describing 
the proposed legislation as “establishing a fiduciary duty for online providers”). 
 201 New York Privacy Act, S. 5642, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); see also Lapowsky, 
supra note 72 (noting “the New York bill would . . . require businesses to act as . . . ‘data fiduciaries’”). 
 202 Khan & Pozen, supra note 73, at 527–28. By “outsized market share,” Professors Khan and Pozen 
refer to the market dominance of digital platforms such as Google and Facebook, which have together 
captured around “three-quarters of all digital advertising sales in the United States.” Id. at 527. They 
argue “that any broad regulatory framework . . . for social media that focuses on abusive data practices, 
without attending to issues of market structure or political-economic influence,” will prove ineffective. 
Id. at 528. 
 203 Id. at 503. 
 204 Id. at 504. 
 205  See id. at 505–06. Reforms to make sites like Facebook “less addictive, to deemphasize 
sensationalistic material, and to enhance personal privacy would arguably be in the best interests of users. 
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Professors Khan and Pozen also contend that Professor Balkin “is all 
but silent on how these new duties would be enforced.”206 Moreover, they 
assert that his proposal “leave[s] many profound problems untouched.”207 
They discuss how the speech environment on digital platforms has produced 
“a host of social ills, from facilitating interference in U.S. elections; . . . to 
enabling discrimination and harassment against women and racial 
minorities; to amplifying the influence of ‘fake news,’ conspiracy theories, 
bot-generated propaganda, and inflammatory and divisive content.”208 They 
argue that these broader harms are magnified “by a behavioral-advertising-
based business model”209 that incentivizes online platforms “to extract as 
much data from their users as they can—a motivation that runs headfirst into 
users’ privacy interests.” 210  They claim that Professor Balkin’s proposal 
inadequately responds to the problems associated with the speech 
environment on digital platforms and with targeted-advertising-based 
business models.211 
Finally, Professors Khan and Pozen suggest that his theory fails to 
account for how the Roberts Court would likely handle “First Amendment 
claims brought by online platforms” designated as information fiduciaries.212 
They point to the recent decision in National Institute of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA)213 as evidence of the Court’s unwillingness to 
recognize professional speech as a separate category of protected speech,214 
undermining Professor Balkin’s broader premise that the law treats speech 
in “professional or other fiduciary relationships . . . as part of ordinary social 
and economic activity that is subject to reasonable regulation.”215 
 
Yet each of these reforms would also pose a threat to Facebook’s bottom line and therefore to the interests 
of shareholders.” Id. 
 206 Id. at 524. 
 207 Id. at 526. 
 208 Id. at 526–27 (citations omitted). 
209 Id. at 527. 
 210 Id. at 512. 
 211 Id. at 540–41. 
 212 Id. at 531–32. 
 213 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). In NIFLA, the Court examined whether the disclosure requirements of a 
California reproductive-rights law violated the First Amendment. Id. at 2368. The law required that 
licensed clinics provide information to patients about free or low-cost services, such as abortions, and 
that unlicensed clinics notify patients of their unlicensed status. Id. The Court held that the disclosures 
violated the First Amendment, finding the licensed notice constituted an impermissible content-based 
regulation and the unlicensed notice unduly burdened protected speech. Id. at 2370–78. 
 214 Id. at 2371–72 (“Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by ‘professionals.’”). 
 215 Khan & Pozen, supra note 73, at 531–32 (quoting Balkin, supra note 74, at 1217). 
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In sum, Professors Khan and Pozen identify several “ambiguities and 
tensions” in the information-fiduciary theory, as well as “concerns about the 
theory’s capacity to resolve them satisfactorily.” 216  The next Section 
responds to each of their criticisms in turn, making the case for why 
Professor Balkin’s information-fiduciary approach should be viewed as a 
promising path forward. 
E. A Defense of the Information-Fiduciary Approach 
Although Professors Khan and Pozen raise legitimate concerns, their 
criticisms can be either refuted by case law or sufficiently addressed by 
clarifying how Professor Balkin’s model might function in practice. 
Therefore, the goal of this Section is twofold: first, to respond to the 
criticisms that are already reconcilable, and second, to lay out the contours 
of an information-fiduciary approach that would adequately respond to their 
remaining concerns. 
1. Reconcilable Criticisms 
Although Professors Khan and Pozen rightly note that the Court has 
never explicitly recognized professional speech as its own special category, 
they fail to account for the extent to which professional speech—especially 
in the context of fiduciary relationships—is treated differently under the First 
Amendment than other types of speech.217 Unlike most speech restrictions, 
laws addressing professional speech may in some instances be subject to 
only rational-basis review, making them more likely to pass muster under 
the First Amendment. Even Justice Clarence Thomas acknowledged this in 
his majority opinion in NIFLA v. Becerra,218 noting that the Court has applied 
only rational-basis review to restrictions on professional speech in two 
circumstances: (1) where laws “require professionals to disclose factual, 
noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech,’”219 and (2) where 
 
 216 Id. at 501. 
 217  Claudia E. Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 128 YALE L.J.F. 185, 188 (2018) 
(“[D]espite the Court’s insistence that it has never recognized professional speech as a category, 
professional speech is distinct.” (citation omitted)). 
 218 138 S. Ct. at 2372–73. 
 219 See id. at 2372; see also Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626, 651 (1985) (upholding a rule requiring lawyers who advertised their services on a contingency-fee 
basis to disclose that clients will have to pay costs, finding that the disclosure requirement need only be 
“reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers”). The relaxed standard 
called for in Zauderer is viewed as akin to a rational-basis standard. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. 
SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 370–71 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court has stated that rational basis review 
applies to certain disclosures of ‘purely factural and uncontroversial information.’” (quoting Zauderer, 
471 U.S. at 651)); N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2009) (“In 
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states regulate “professional conduct that incidentally burden[s] speech.”220 
Rational-basis review, unlike intermediate or strict scrutiny, is a relaxed 
standard requiring that a law or regulation be only “rationally related” to a 
legitimate governmental interest to be constitutional.221 Courts have afforded 
rational-basis review to restrictions on professional speech—especially that 
of doctors, lawyers, and other traditional fiduciaries—in four crucial 
realms222: professional licensing,223 fiduciary duties,224 informed consent,225 
and malpractice liability. 226  The fact that courts have carved out special 
exceptions for state regulation in these realms indicates that the First 
 
light of Zauderer, this Circuit thus held that rules mandating that commercial actors disclose commercial 
information are subject to the rational basis test.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 220 138 S. Ct. at 2373; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457, 460–63 (1978) 
(upholding a disciplinary proceeding arising from a lawyer’s in-person solicitation of clients where 
speech was “an essential but subordinate component” of the lawyer’s conduct, finding that there was “a 
legitimate and important state interest” in regulation). 
 221 See Micah L. Berman, Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial Speech, 50 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 53, 59 (2016). 
 222 See Haupt, supra note 217, at 190. Professional-licensing schemes represent “state laws enacted 
under the states’ police powers” that are designed to ensure that patients and clients receive advice from 
qualified professionals. Id. Fiduciary duties and informed consent both “address the knowledge 
asymmetries between professionals and their clients or patients,” with the former “creating duties of 
loyalty and care” that must be followed and the latter “ensuring that the interest in patient autonomy is 
protected. . . . Malpractice liability rests on the premise that . . . . [b]ad professional advice,” as 
determined by the standards of the relevant knowledge community, “is subject to tort liability, and the 
First Amendment provides no defense.” Id. at 191 (emphasis omitted). 
 223 See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889) (upholding a licensing requirement to 
practice medicine, concluding that “[t]he law of West Virginia was intended to secure such skill and 
learning in the profession of medicine that the community might trust with confidence those receiving a 
license under authority of the State”); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of 
Psych., 228 F.3d 1043, 1056 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding a licensing requirement for mental-health 
professionals against a First Amendment challenge). 
 224 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (outlining the duty of “due 
care” owed by a physician); Hendricks v. Clemson Univ., 578 S.E.2d 711, 716 (S.C. 2003) (“Historically, 
[the South Carolina Supreme Court] has reserved imposition of fiduciary duties to legal or business 
settings, often in which one person entrusts money to another, such as with lawyers, brokers, corporate 
directors, and corporate promoters.”). 
 225 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(upholding a law requiring physicians to obtain informed consent before they could perform an abortion, 
finding that “the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the 
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State” (citations omitted)); 
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (“The informed consent doctrine has 
become firmly entrenched in American tort law.”). 
 226  See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (noting that while torts for legal 
malpractice “fall within the traditional purview of state regulation of professional conduct,” the subject 
of professional standards does not outweigh First Amendment rights of NAACP lawyers); Shea v. Bd. of 
Med. Exam’rs, 146 Cal. Rptr. 653, 661 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding a doctor whose “conduct violated the 
trust reposed in him by his patients” liable for malpractice). 
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Amendment treats fiduciary relationships differently in practice. Professors 
Khan and Pozen’s skepticism about First Amendment flexibility as applied 
to fiduciary relationships thus runs counter to “centuries of equity, torts, and 
other common law doctrine.”227 
Professors Khan and Pozen do raise the valid point that “[e]ven if the 
Court . . . [has] some sort of relaxed standard of First Amendment review for 
regulations of traditional fiduciary–beneficiary communications, it is not at 
all clear that the Court would apply this standard to the special case of digital 
information fiduciaries.” 228  They argue that Professor “Balkin’s crucial 
concession that the fiduciary duties owed by [digital] platforms” would be 
more limited than those owed by traditional fiduciaries means that state 
regulation would have to be more limited as well.229 But these insights only 
reaffirm the importance of narrowly tailoring the duties owed by online 
service providers to what should reasonably be expected of them based on 
the services they offer.230 
For instance, doctors are reasonably expected to warn patients about 
health risks precisely because doctors “present themselves as learned 
professionals concerned with our health.”231 Unlike doctors, digital platforms 
“do not hold themselves out as taking care of end-users in general” but as 
helping users “connect with other people,” which they accomplish through 
their collection and use of end-user data. 232  Therefore, a company like 
Facebook would not be reasonably expected to warn users not to watch an 
emotionally disturbing video or befriend a dangerous person but would be 
expected to provide users with meaningful control over their personal data 
and warn them about the consequences of Facebook’s data collection and 
use practices.233 
There are important differences between traditional fiduciaries and 
digital-information fiduciaries, necessitating that we “connect the kinds of 
duties that information fiduciaries have to the services they provide.”234 But 
assuming a strong enough case is made for designating online service 
providers as information fiduciaries,235 these differences should not affect the 
 
 227 Richard S. Whitt, Old School Goes Online: Exploring Fiduciary Obligations of Loyalty and Care 
in the Digital Platforms Era, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 75, 86 (2019). 
 228 Khan & Pozen, supra note 73, at 532. 
 229 Id. 
 230 See Balkin, supra note 74, at 1229. 
 231 Id. at 1228. 
 232 Id. 
 233 See id. at 1228–29. 
 234 Id. at 1229. 
 235 See supra Section III.B. 
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Court’s willingness to apply a relaxed First Amendment standard of review 
for regulations of digital platforms.236 
Professors Khan and Pozen’s remaining criticisms focus less on the 
constitutionality of the information-fiduciary model than on its actual 
effectiveness in remedying the problems associated with the speech 
environment on social media and with targeted-advertising business 
models.237 The following Section lays out the contours of an information-
fiduciary approach that would adequately respond to their remaining 
concerns. 
2. A “Promising” Information-Fiduciary Model 
Professors Khan and Pozen correctly point out that, in the absence of 
“heavy-handed government intervention,”238 digital platforms would prove 
unable to manage their divided loyalties to their stockholders and end 
users.239 But enactment of a federal statute would solve this problem by 
explicitly imposing on online service providers fiduciary duties toward their 
end users, superseding any duties owed to their shareholders. The proposed 
New York Privacy Act offers a useful model for managing the divided 
loyalties of digital platforms, stating that 
[e]very legal entity, or any affiliate of such entity, and every controller and data 
broker, which collects, sells or licenses personal information of consumers, 
shall exercise the duty of care, loyalty and confidentiality expected of a 
fiduciary with respect to securing the personal data of a consumer against a 
privacy risk; and shall act in the best interests of the consumer, without regard 
to the interests of the entity, controller or data broker, in a manner expected by 
a reasonable consumer under the circumstances.240 
A federal statute “that clearly prioritizes”241 the fiduciary duties owed 
by online service providers to their end users would preempt any existing 
obligations owed by Delaware corporations—such as Facebook, Google, 
and Twitter—to their stockholders under Delaware law. 242  Accordingly, 
 
 236 See sources cited supra notes 217–227 and accompanying text. 
 237 Khan & Pozen, supra note 73, at 540–41. 
 238 Id. at 504 (quoting Jonathan Zittrain, How to Exercise the Power You Didn’t Ask For, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Sept. 19, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-to-exercise-the-power-you-didnt-ask-for 
[https://perma.cc/EAN3-KCYC]). 
 239 Id. at 508 (“Balkin has never squarely addressed the issue of crosscutting loyalties.”). 
 240 S. 5642, § 1102, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). 
 241 Khan & Pozen, supra note 73, at 504. 
 242 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”); see also Gade v. Nat’l 
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Professors Khan and Pozen’s concern about the “crosscutting loyalties” of 
online platforms243 would no longer apply, as federal law would mandate that 
these entities put the interests of their end users first. 
Passing any federal legislation in today’s difficult political environment 
is challenging, at best, but there are several reasons to be hopeful about this 
particular proposal. As it currently stands, Professor Balkin’s information-
fiduciary approach already enjoys some bipartisan support. 244  Although 
congressional gridlock has so far hindered the passage of a federal data-
privacy bill, 245  the 2020 election has resulted in a unified national 
government 246  that may prove capable of pushing through legislation. 
Furthermore, the model has gained praise from Mark Zuckerberg247—one of 
Big Tech’s most powerful voices—signaling that the information-fiduciary 
approach may also have the backing of the tech industry. The current 
“patchwork of state and local laws about online privacy” has made a uniform 
federal bill increasingly desirable to tech companies wishing to escape the 
uncertainty of legal liability.248 Since going into effect in January of 2020, 
 
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (outlining the doctrine of preemption, which holds 
that federal law supersedes conflicting state law). 
 243 See Khan & Pozen, supra note 73, at 508. Professors Khan and Pozen raise the legitimate concern 
that reforms implicating the business models of online service providers, like Facebook, may pose a threat 
to their bottom line and to the interests of shareholders. Id. at 506. But as this Note later points out, the 
government has a legitimate interest in promoting electoral integrity, making any fiscal consequences 
born on online service providers sufficiently warranted. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 244 See, e.g., 164 CONG. REC. S2026 (Apr. 10, 2018) (statement of Republican Sen. John Cornyn) 
(“Perhaps we should treat social media platforms as information fiduciaries and impose legal obligations 
on them, as we do with lawyers and doctors, who are privy to some of our most personal, private 
information.”); Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (codifying legislation proposed by fifteen 
Democratic senators establishing fiduciary duties for online providers). 
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the CCPA—through its private cause of action—has already triggered at 
least forty-six lawsuits,249 highlighting how compliance with stronger state 
laws has become especially burdensome for tech companies.250 A federal 
statute that offers the imposition of fiduciary duties in exchange for federal 
immunity from conflicting state and local regulations would likely appeal to 
Big Tech,251 making its enactment politically feasible. 
Professors Khan and Pozen also characterize Professor Balkin’s 
proposal as an inadequate response to the broader harms produced by social 
media—such as electoral interference, discrimination against women and 
minorities, and the spread of fake news252—and the problematic incentives 
of targeted advertising where companies are “economically motivated to 
extract as much data” as possible from their users.253 However, applying the 
information-fiduciary model to the issue of political microtargeting on 
Facebook shows how Professor Balkin’s approach could effectively respond 
to the issues plaguing the speech environment on social media as well as the 
problems inherent in targeted advertising more generally. 
In Part IV, this Note argues that the information-fiduciary concept, 
when applied to Facebook, would require both (1) the expansion of 
Facebook’s current notice-and-choice framework for receiving end-user 
consent to run microtargeted political ads, and (2) the imposition of a new 
liability regime that subjects Facebook to the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, 
and confidentiality towards its end users’ data. Holding Facebook and other 
digital platforms that engage in political advertising to an information-
fiduciary standard would ameliorate some of the adverse effects of political 
microtargeting and address the broader societal goal of promoting electoral 
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integrity in our digital age. Most importantly, this proposed framework is not 
limited to political advertising but is equally applicable in the commercial-
advertising context, offering a promising path forward for responding to 
some of the most pressing challenges of today’s digital landscape. 
IV. THE ADOPTION OF AN INFORMATION-FIDUCIARY STANDARD 
This final Part offers a proposed framework for enforcing Professor 
Balkin’s model on digital platforms that engage in political microtargeting 
by specifically examining what enforcement would look like on Facebook—
the social media platform running the most political ads. It then demonstrates 
the broader applicability of this framework to the commercial advertising 
context. 
A. An Information-Fiduciary Approach to Political Microtargeting 
As stated, treating Facebook as an information fiduciary would require 
(1) the expansion of Facebook’s current notice-and-choice framework for 
receiving end-user consent to run microtargeted political ads, and (2) the 
imposition of a liability regime that subjects Facebook to the fiduciary duties 
of care, loyalty, and confidentiality when handling end-user data. 
1. Expansion of Facebook’s Current Notice-and-Choice Framework 
Under an information-fiduciary regime, Facebook would have to 
significantly revamp its approach to obtaining end-user consent to run 
microtargeted political ads. Much like other digital platforms, Facebook 
relies on a notice-and-choice regime for garnering consent to collect and use 
the personal data of its end users.254 By providing individuals with notice 
about the data collected and used about them and giving individuals the 
choice to opt out of such collection and uses, Facebook operates under the 
assumption that its end users can sufficiently handle and protect their own 
personal data through privacy self-management. 255  However, this 
assumption is illusory,256 especially in the context of political microtargeting. 
For instance, on the “About Facebook Ads” page, Facebook informs 
individuals why advertisers may be showing users particular ads and gives 
them the choice to modify their ad preferences.257 But crucially missing is 
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any discussion of the consequences of political microtargeting. Informed 
consent constitutes a fundamental aspect of the fiduciary relationship. 258 
However, Facebook’s failure to include warnings about the risks associated 
with political microtargeting renders any “consent” to run microtargeted ads 
effectively meaningless, spotlighting the need for Facebook to implement a 
new system for obtaining informed consent from its end users. 
First, Facebook would have to provide its users with adequate notice. 
This requires more than just notifying users about how their personal data 
influences what ads they are shown, but actually informing users about the 
negative effects of political microtargeting. Disclosure in the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) context offers a 
useful analogue for conceptualizing how to provide Facebook users adequate 
notice about political microtargeting. Before a patient can give informed 
consent for a medical operation, the service provider must disclose enough 
information so that the patient can make an informed decision.259 While the 
patient need not receive every small detail about a medical procedure, the 
patient must, at a minimum, receive information in plain language about the 
potential risks or benefits associated with the procedure and any other 
information that would be expected by a reasonable person to make an 
informed decision.260 
The same should hold true in the context of political microtargeting on 
Facebook. Just as medical patients cannot be expected to provide informed 
consent to an operation without receiving information about the risks and 
benefits of the procedure, Facebook users cannot be expected to provide 
informed consent to receive targeted ads without obtaining information 
about the risks and benefits of political microtargeting. For users to give 
informed consent to receive microtargeted political ads, Facebook must 
provide its users with enough information to make an informed decision. 
Details about how political advertising on Facebook can lead to voter 
manipulation, digital gerrymandering, and the exacerbation of political and 
social divisions is precisely the type of information that would be expected 
by a reasonable person to make an informed decision. 261  For instance, 
Facebook should warn users that when receiving political ads, they may be 
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uniquely susceptible to strategic influence or manipulation based on their 
data profile. 262  Facebook should inform users that because of digital 
gerrymandering, they may be targeted with certain ads aimed to suppress 
their vote or be purposefully excluded from advertising altogether. 263 
Facebook should also notify users that they may only be seeing ads that 
reinforce their preexisting views or that are intentionally inflammatory.264 
Users need not receive exhaustive detail about political microtargeting, 
but they should, at a minimum, receive a brief synopsis in plain language of 
the potential risks associated with this practice and links to additional 
resources—preferably official government websites—to learn more about 
political microtargeting. The information could be displayed in the form of 
a pop-up message each time a user receives a microtargeted political ad; 
however, Facebook could give users the option to deactivate the pop-up 
message from appearing on future political ads. 
Courts would likely treat a mandated disclosure about political 
microtargeting as compelled commercial speech subject to Zauderer’s 
rational-basis test, requiring that it contain only “factual, noncontroversial 
information” and be “reasonably related” to a legitimate governmental 
interest. 265  Federal legislation compelling Facebook and other digital 
platforms to communicate the risks of political microtargeting would likely 
satisfy Zauderer, as disclosure of such information reasonably relates to the 
government’s legitimate interest in promoting electoral integrity.266 
Second, Facebook must provide its users with meaningful choice over 
how to receive political ads. For users to possess meaningful choice, they 
must have the opportunity to shape their political-advertising experiences in 
clear and tangible ways. The problem with Facebook’s current approach is 
not that users lack actual choices—in fact, users possess quite a few ways to 
alter their ad preferences—but that users have no way of conceptualizing 
how their choices affect the types of ads they are shown. 
On the “Ad Preferences” page, users can select whether to receive ads 
based on relationship status, employer, job title, education, and other 
categories set by Facebook, as well as whether to temporarily or permanently 
hide ad topics from appearing in their newsfeed.267 Users can also opt out of 
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receiving ads based on data collected from Facebook’s partners or from 
Facebook Company Products,268 such as Instagram and WhatsApp.269 But 
Facebook does not give users a clear sense of how their newsfeeds would 
change with certain ad settings, leaving users with no way of knowing 
whether they should adjust their ad preferences. 
Facebook’s Ad Preferences page should be modified so that when users 
click on a specific setting, they are provided with examples of political ads 
in their newsfeed that appear because of that setting.270 For instance, say a 
user is deciding whether to opt out of receiving ads based on her education, 
but would like to understand the types of ads that are influenced by this 
setting. By clicking on the education setting, the user should be able to see 
examples of political ads that she received because of her education, 
allowing her to make a more informed decision about whether to disable this 
setting. By providing users with a better sense of how their political ads are 
targeted, users will likely be more inclined to modify how they receive 
political ads, given that most Americans oppose microtargeting in the first 
place.271 
2. Imposition of Fiduciary Duties of Care, Loyalty,  
and Confidentiality 
As an information fiduciary, Facebook would also be expected to abide 
by the duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality in its handling of end-user 
data. Essentially, Facebook would be required to honor and promote the 
choices of its end users regarding how their personal data can be used for 
political microtargeting purposes. 
Under the duty of care, Facebook would be obligated to advance the 
interests of its end users. For users that either opt out of receiving 
microtargeted political ads entirely or modify how their data can be used, 
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Facebook would have the duty to ensure that their preferences are respected, 
and that political advertisers are not misappropriating their personal data. For 
users that choose to stick with the status quo, Facebook would be required to 
respect their preferences as well. Facebook would already be in violation of 
its duty of care, given that its ad-delivery system—even when advertisers 
input identical targeting parameters—preferentially delivers ads to users 
deemed most “relevant.”272 Facebook would have a duty not only to fix its 
algorithms so that political ads are no longer delivered to users in a biased 
fashion, but also to continuously monitor its algorithms through yearly or bi-
yearly internal audits. Finally, Facebook would have a duty to warn users 
about potentially false or misleading political ads. Facebook’s policy during 
the 2020 election of labeling all posts related to mail-in voting with a 
message about how to receive official voting information was not the same 
as warning users. 273  To satisfy its duty of care, Facebook must flag the 
specific posts that are potentially false or misleading to protect its users from 
the growing threat of voter suppression in future elections. 
Under the duty of loyalty, Facebook would be required to prioritize the 
interests of its end users, even if that means deviating from its current 
business model. Efforts to warn users about the dangers of political 
microtargeting would likely affect Facebook’s bottom line, assuming these 
efforts result in more users opting out of receiving microtargeted political 
ads. Facebook would be required to honor the microtargeting preferences of 
its users regardless of the financial consequences. Such fiscal consequences 
would be warranted given the government’s legitimate interest in promoting 
electoral integrity, representing a new cost of doing business. 
Finally, under the duty of confidentiality, Facebook would be obliged 
to maintain the trust and confidence of its end users by not sharing their 
personal data with third parties without their informed consent. The 
Cambridge Analytica scandal constituted a massive breach of Facebook’s 
duty of confidentiality, as Facebook allowed a third party—Cambridge 
Analytica—to access data from up to eighty-seven million Facebook users 
without their consent.274 Facebook must only use end-user data for political 
microtargeting if it has been explicitly authorized to do so. 
Courts would likely analyze whether imposition of these fiduciary 
duties is a “regulation[] of professional conduct that incidentally burden[s] 
speech.”275 Any burdens imposed on the speech of political advertisers would 
be plainly incidental to the legislation’s primary goal of regulating online 
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platforms’ handling of end-user data and should, therefore, pass 
constitutional muster. In sum, treating Facebook as an information fiduciary 
would mean holding Facebook to the same duties of care, loyalty, and 
confidentiality that make up the traditional fiduciary relationship. Subjecting 
Facebook and other digital platforms to this information-fiduciary standard 
would both mitigate the negative effects of political microtargeting that 
plague the speech environment on social media, as well as promote electoral 
integrity in our digital age. 
B. The Broader Applicability to Targeted Commercial Advertising 
The information-fiduciary approach is applicable with equal force in 
the commercial-advertising context. Digital companies would need to 
similarly restructure their websites to ensure that customers are providing 
their informed consent when choosing not to opt out of receiving targeted 
commercial ads. These companies must provide their consumers with 
adequate notice about how targeted commercial advertising can lead to 
algorithmic discrimination and consumer manipulation, 276  and with 
meaningful choice over how to receive commercial ads. As information 
fiduciaries, these companies would also be expected to abide by the duties 
of care, loyalty, and confidentiality when handling customer data. Federal 
legislation imposing fiduciary duties on online service providers would 
greatly bolster consumer protections, resolving Professors Khan and Pozen’s 
concern about the problems inherent in targeting advertising business 
models. 
CONCLUSION 
Professors Lina Khan and David Pozen directly challenged supporters 
of the information-fiduciary model to demonstrate why it is a promising path 
forward. This Note has taken them up on this challenge, illustrating how 
Professor Balkin’s information-fiduciary approach would mitigate the risks 
of political microtargeting on digital platforms. Recognizing the limitations 
of Professor Balkin’s proposal, this Note advocates for the passage of federal 
legislation that would instill online service providers with fiduciary duties 
toward their end users that trump any duties owed to their shareholders. This 
Note outlines what enforcement of these duties would look like in the 
particular context of political microtargeting on Facebook, while also 
providing a model for their application in the context of targeted commercial 
advertising more broadly. And, most importantly, this Note demonstrates 
that treating digital platforms as information fiduciaries reconciles data 
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privacy with the First Amendment, offering a promising path forward for 
responding to some of the most pressing challenges of our digital age. 
Today, as our nation grapples with one of the worst public-health crises 
in modern history and the tumultuous aftermath of the 2020 presidential 
election, the stakes for data-privacy reform have never been higher. 
Misinformation surrounding COVID-19, as well as the results of the 
election, has sown doubt and division across the American populace, 
threatening to tear apart the social fabric of our country. The attempted coup 
at the U.S. Capitol—an unprecedented assault on American democracy—
epitomizes the fateful consequences that can arise when conspiracy theories 
and mistruths are able to spread unchecked on digital platforms.277 Therefore, 
online service providers have a heightened responsibility to ensure that the 
data of their end users is protected, not exploited by nefarious actors. If there 
were ever a time for designating online service providers as information 
fiduciaries, it is now. 
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